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**EQUIPPING THE WARFIGHTER IN  
AFGHANISTAN**

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HEARING

BEFORE THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL  
AIR AND LAND FORCES

OF THE

COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ONE HUNDRED TWELFTH CONGRESS

FIRST SESSION

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HEARING HELD  
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SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES

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[There were no Documents submitted.]

##### WITNESS RESPONSES TO QUESTIONS ASKED DURING THE HEARING:

[There were no Questions submitted during the hearing.]

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## **EQUIPPING THE WARFIGHTER IN AFGHANISTAN**

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HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES,  
COMMITTEE ON ARMED SERVICES,  
SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES,  
*Washington, DC, Tuesday, March 1, 2011.*

The subcommittee met, pursuant to call, at 3:35 p.m., in room 2118, Rayburn House Office Building, Hon. Roscoe G. Bartlett (chairman of the subcommittee) presiding.

### **OPENING STATEMENT OF HON. ROSCOE G. BARTLETT, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM MARYLAND, CHAIRMAN, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES**

Mr. BARTLETT. The Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on the Department of Defense processes and procedures currently used to rapidly respond to and fulfill urgent warfighter capability requirements.

These urgently required capabilities are defined by the Department of Defense as capabilities that if left unfulfilled, usually within days or weeks, could result in the loss of life and/or prevent the successful completion of a near-term military mission.

We just received a classified briefing on equipping U.S. Forces in Afghanistan and learned of the current capabilities being used by the warfighter, as well as what the warfighter currently requires. We want to make sure that the processes are in place or get put in place to get our warfighters the equipment they need as quickly as they can get that equipment.

The Department's record in quickly getting needed capabilities to the warfighter has not been what it should have been. This was most evident in the Department's slow response to the improvised explosive device threat. On the other end of the spectrum of responsiveness is the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle program, which shows what can be done when the Department of Defense partners with industry.

We believe we have now fielded the best warfighter equipment available, but as long as we have injuries in the field, we must continue to do everything possible to better protect our people. With 147,000 service men and women operating in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is our mission to ensure that they are provided with the most effective equipment available, in a timely manner, and not repeat previous mistakes.

There have been numerous studies and reports by independent and government agencies that have all cited inefficiencies in the Department's ability to rapidly respond to warfighter capability requirements.

The GAO [Government Accountability Office] notes that, currently, multiple entities in the Department of Defense reported a role in responding to similar categories of urgently needed capabilities: Five entities have a role in responding to counter-IED [counter-Improvised Explosive Device] capabilities; eight entities have a role in responding to ISR [Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance] capabilities; and six entities have a role in responding to command, control, communications, and computer capabilities.

The committee is aware of an urgent request that was made last July by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan for advanced analytic capability to analyze the tremendous amounts of intelligence information being collected. The request stated, "This shortfall translates into operational opportunities missed and lives lost."

Further, this specific capability was described by an intelligence officer in Afghanistan as "enabling U.S. Forces' ability to find insurgent targets to skyrocket." The specific capability being requested by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan was off-the-shelf. It already was being used by 30 separate units and agencies in Afghanistan and here in the United States.

When our committee chairman and ranking member wrote the Department in October, 3 months after the request had been made, asking why this capability was being delayed, it was determined the request had not even yet made it to Washington. This analytic capability is only now being fielded in limited numbers while the fielding of the promised program of record capability has slipped from November of last year to the end of this month.

The committee is also aware that due to the large number of services', agencies', and organizations' failures to use common databases for these urgent requests, duplication occurs in responding to urgent requests. In one instance, an agency spent millions-of-dollars doing a proof of concept on an off-the-shelf rotorcraft unmanned aerial vehicle that was already being used by another service.

According to the GAO, the Department does not comprehensively manage and oversee its urgent needs efforts; overlap and duplication exists in the Department's urgent needs efforts; and several challenges, such as funding, training, technology, and maturity of proposed solutions, could hinder the Department's responsiveness to urgent needs in the future.

We recognize the Department has taken steps to create urgent needs processes that are more responsive to urgent warfighter requests than traditional acquisition procedures, yet the Department has been at this for 10 years, and very clearly, much needs to be done in establishing an institutionalized capability and process.

Congress has given the Department of Defense rapid acquisition authority. This authority allows for the rapid acquisition and deployment of equipment that is urgently needed to eliminate a combat capability gap that has resulted in combat fatalities. The subcommittee believes the Department could improve employment of this rapid acquisition authority and better inform decisionmakers within the Department that this authority exists. Over the past 5 years, the Department has only used this authority four times.

The Government Accountability Office released a report today that is critical of the Department's processes and makes several recommendations for improvements. I would hope the Department will expeditiously implement these recommendations. We are prepared to help, if necessary, legislatively.

Finally, I again want to assure the men and women in uniform and their families that while the acquisition process has oftentimes been inefficient and duplicative, it has provided the best equipment available to our warfighters.

Before we begin, I would like to turn to my good friend and colleague from Texas, Silvestre Reyes.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Bartlett can be found in the Appendix on page 27.]

**STATEMENT OF HON. SILVESTRE REYES, A REPRESENTATIVE FROM TEXAS, RANKING MEMBER, SUBCOMMITTEE ON TACTICAL AIR AND LAND FORCES**

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And today's hearing covers the critical topic of how the Department of Defense fields urgent warfighter needs from the field.

This subcommittee has always operated in a bipartisan manner that focuses on the needs of the troops in the field.

So I want to thank you, Mr. Chairman, for having this hearing on this vital issue, and this being our first hearing, I hope it underscores the importance of this topic.

For the purposes of providing oversight to DOD [the Department of Defense] and the military services on this issue, I think this subcommittee must focus on two key areas: One issue is the efficiency, as you mentioned, of responding to the operational needs of warfighters in a way that avoids wasting money. While efficiency is important and is always something that we should focus on, I think it comes in a distant second to the other critical issue, which is speed, the speed of DOD's responses to urgent operational needs in the field, in other words, the warfighters and their needs.

To me, this is the overriding issue that we face because getting a capability into the hands of a soldier, even if it isn't the perfect solution or the most affordable, can and often does save lives.

We saw this with the process DOD went through to get MRAPs [Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicles] in the field. In the end, it took Congress and Secretary Gates constantly pushing to get these life-saving vehicles deployed. That, regrettably, should not have been the case, but it is something hopefully we can all learn from.

But after reading, as you mentioned, GAO's testimony on this issue for today's hearing, I am not entirely sure that the Defense Department and the military services have fully appreciated and learned the lessons they should have from the MRAP program.

While I have no doubt that servicemembers and civilians alike at the Pentagon are doing the very best that they can to act quickly and that they are working hard every single day, it appears that the system, as we all talk about the system, for responding to urgent needs has become overly onerous, complex, bureaucratic, and slow.

The GAO identified at least 30 different organizations in the Department of Defense involved in responding to these urgent operational needs. They also point out that no single high-ranking individual is in charge. This is a critical lesson learned from the MRAP program.

Given the massive amounts of funding involved, at least \$76 billion since 2005, and then the urgency of the needs, it is not acceptable, simply not acceptable, to have the level of fragmentation and overlap that GAO has reported and found in their study.

In addition to understanding what needs to happen with DOD, today's hearing will hopefully also help our subcommittee identify where Congress can act to improve the system, whether through changes in how we provide funding or the authorities given to the military services. This needs to be a team effort between Congress and DOD.

So, again, Mr. Chairman, thank you for calling this hearing on this vital and critical issue, and I look forward to working with you on the topic as we build a National Defense Authorization Act for the year 2012.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Reyes can be found in the Appendix on page 29.]

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

Two bells followed by five bells means a series of votes is on. We have perhaps 10 minutes or so before we need to leave at about 2 minutes before the vote is scheduled to close so that we can get our vote. So we can begin your testimony. Depending on how long your testimony is, we can have testimony from one of you or both of you. I want to thank you very much for coming today.

Mr. Tom Dee, Director, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell. Mr. Dee is also representing the Deputy Secretary of Defense William Lynn and the Department's Chief Management Officer.

And Mr. Bill Solis, Director of Defense Capabilities and Management, Government Accountability Office.

We will proceed with the panel's testimony, as much as we can before we need to go to vote, and without objection, all the witnesses' prepared statements will be included in the hearing record.

Thank you, sir. You may begin.

**STATEMENT OF THOMAS P. DEE, DIRECTOR, JOINT RAPID ACQUISITION CELL, OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE, ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS**

Mr. DEE. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, members of the Tactical Air and Land Subcommittee, thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Department of Defense's urgent operational needs processes.

The experience of war has taught us that new enemy weapons and tactics will emerge in times of conflict and that we will not always have existing capability or capacity to adequately counter those new threats. Addressing those unanticipated threats is the underlying purpose of the Department's urgent needs processes.

As is the case for our deliberate requirements and resource allocation processes: JCIDS, the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System; PPBES, the Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System; and the acquisition processes, the urgent



needs process is comprised of three main elements: deciding what you need, the requirements; providing adequate resources to buy it, the programming and budgeting; and assessing alternatives and executing a solution, the acquisition process, to include the operation and maintenance. A fourth critical step, fielding, is also vitally important to address since this can be the limiting factor in a contingency situation and will shape the suitability of any proposed solution.

The challenge for the JUONs [Joint Urgent Operational Needs] process is how to execute each element on a much more compressed timeline, often in the absence of well-defined requirements, supporting CONOPS [Concept of Operations] and doctrine, and/or supporting operations and maintenance concepts. Working under such compressed timelines, the Department necessarily accepts some higher level of programmatic risk in traditional areas of cost, schedule and performance. In a time of war, schedule often becomes the risk that is least acceptable because the speed at which something can be fielded, even if it is only a mitigating capability, is often the most relevant factor in reducing the commander's operational risk. Not surprisingly, therefore, the commander's assessment of his operational risk is where the urgent needs process begins.

As you pointed out and as identified in a recent GAO study, there are multiple mechanisms through which a commander can submit an urgent operational needs request. Appropriately, under Title X responsibilities, the service components have all established processes to facilitate a timely response to identified warfighter needs.

In cases where a commander identifies the need as joint, the combatant commander certifies the requirement and forwards it to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for validation as a joint urgent operational need. The Joint Staff Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessments, the J8, uses its established functional capability boards to assess both the validity and the urgency of the requirement. Should the Joint Staff J8 Deputy Director for Requirements, the DDR, determine that the need is valid and that it is urgent, he passes it to me as the Director of the OSD's [the Office of the Secretary of Defense's] Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell.

I, in turn, coordinate with the service components, JIEDDO [the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization], the ISR Task Force, other elements of OSD, including the Offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering, the Assistant Secretary for Logistics and Material Readiness, and various Defense agencies to identify potential solutions to the validated requirements and any challenges or risks associated with executing that solution.

We then formally task the appropriate component with the responsibility to satisfy the need. Now this is not a strictly linear process. As soon as the need is identified, the combatant commander, CENTCOM [Central Command] in most cases, Joint Staff, the JRAC [Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell] and the services begin collaborating to determine the most suitable way forward.

There are many challenges associated with compressing the requirements, budgeting, and acquisition cycle, but despite these

challenges, through our urgent needs processes, the Department has provided our forces with the best force protection, command and control, counter-IED, and ISR capabilities available.

Now, that is not to say that the Department is fully satisfied with our processes, with the speed at which we could field new capabilities, and our ability to anticipate the next threat or with the efficiency with which the whole process works. In our 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review, the Department recognized the continuing need to build agile, adaptive, and innovative structures capable of quickly identifying emerging gaps and rapidly adjusting programming and budget priorities to mitigate those gaps. Our urgent processes must provide a means of quickly prioritizing and quantifying requirements and of ensuring that the resources are available to enable rapid fielding of capabilities inside of the Department's PPBES cycle.

The Department has also acknowledged and largely concurred with the findings and recommendations of the April 2010 GAO report on DOD's urgent needs processes. Contained in that report are recommendations that the Department implement the comprehensive management framework with better defined accountability to improve our responsiveness to urgent operational needs.

Section 804 of the fiscal year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act further directs the Department to conduct a complete review of the process for fielding capabilities in response to urgent operational needs and to include consideration of earlier GAO reports and a July 2009 congressionally directed study by the Defense Science Board on the fulfillment of urgent operational needs. The legislation recommends a streamlined and tightly integrated approach to the Department's urgent needs processes, clear definition of the roles and responsibilities within the Department for the fulfillment of urgent needs, and the development of an expedited review process to determine which needs are appropriate for a rapid fielding process.

Concurrent with the development of many of these reports, the Department has adapted its urgent processes. Beginning in 2009, the President's revised strategy in Afghanistan has served as a catalyst to initiate, if not fully implement, many of the actions recommended in the GAO reports. Among the common findings of these many reports is the perceived lack of a common management framework and clear senior leadership of our urgent needs processes.

Recognizing the need for improved synergies among the multiple organizations that contribute to the counter-IED campaign, the Secretary of Defense established a Counter-IED Senior Integration Group in November 2009 to leverage the efforts of JIEDDO, the military services, the Defense agencies, the MRAP task force, and the ISR task force. Under the leadership of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, Dr. Ashton Carter, and the Joint Staff Director of Operations, the J3, then Lieutenant General Jay Paxton, now Lieutenant General Bob Miller, the C-SIG [Counter-IED Senior Integration Group] provided clear priorities and common focus in the counter-IED fight.

It quickly became clear, however, that counter-IED is not a strictly confined problem set. Multiple capabilities, ranging from

ISR to force protection, contribute to a successful counter-IED campaign. So under the Under Secretary of Defense's AT&L [acquisition, technology and logistics] Dr. Carter's leadership and with the Secretary's consent, the C-SIG has evolved to include oversight of many of the most critical and urgent needs of our operational commanders. While the evolved role of the Senior Integration Group does not yet enjoy the clarity of a written policy directive, the senior governance board provides Department-wide focus on expeditiously meeting the urgent needs of our commanders.

A recent organizational change indicative of this improved senior leader focus was the realignment of my office, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, from the Rapid Fielding Directorate within the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering to a direct report to Dr. Carter as the Under Secretary of Defense for AT&L. This organizational change has streamlined the decision process for those urgent needs submitted by the operational commanders and validated by the Joint Staff.

For example, multiple urgent needs that had been identified since the beginning of this fiscal year had been languishing for lack of funding. With his direct involvement in the process, Dr. Carter was quickly able to bring the issue to the attention of Secretary Gates, who convened a meeting of the Department's leadership and made a decision to immediately fund and execute these urgent needs. Within the authorities available to the Department, \$350 million was quickly realigned to support those critical needs that could be executed quickly. An additional \$1 billion of requirements was also quickly sourced, but since the Department did not have the authority to reapportion these funds, a prior notification reprogramming request was submitted to Congress for approval.

Please accept my thanks on behalf of the Department for your committee's quick response to this request and approval of part three for urgent needs. But unfortunately, due to the Department acting without a fiscal year 2011 appropriation, the Department lacks a fiscal year 2011 source to support the requested urgent operations and maintenance requirements. Nevertheless, this action, this reprogramming action, demonstrates the Department's commitment at the very highest level to quickly make the decisions necessary to respond to warfighter requirements.

Another example of improved focus on urgent needs is the increased use of rapid acquisition authority, which you addressed in your statement, Mr. Chairman. It was originally provided in section 811 of the NDAA [National Defense Authorization Act] for fiscal year 2005 and was further amended this year. Use of this authority is identified, further identified, as an interest item on your committee's oversight agenda for the 112th Congress, and I would take to this opportunity to also thank the committee for its action in the fiscal year 2011 National Defense Authorization Act that expanded this authority to include supplies as well as equipment and, more importantly, for expanding the authority from \$100 million—

Mr. BARTLETT. I am sorry. We have a few minutes left in our vote. So we need to recess now to go vote, and we will finish your testimony when we return and then get to the testimony from GAO. Thank you very much.

[Recess.]

Mr. BARTLETT. We will reconvene our subcommittee. There was a little confusion on the floor. The last vote was voiced, and that wasn't very clear, so some people are still waiting I think for a vote that is not going to occur.

Mr. Dee, we will let you complete your testimony and then proceed with the GAO testimony.

Mr. DEE. Sure. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Let me pick up by again thanking you for the action the committee has taken in modifying the rapid acquisition authority within fiscal year 2011 expanding NDAA, expanding the authority from \$100 million to \$200 million per fiscal year. The Department has already made use of this expanded authority and used \$116 million as part of the aforementioned decision by the Secretary to immediately fund those most urgent and executable needs.

As our management framework continues to evolve, our processes and policies must ensure that all components place appropriate priority and use all available authorities to deliver timely and effective capabilities to meet the urgent needs of our operational commanders. To that end, in March 2010, Dr. Carter, Under Secretary for AT&L, issued a memorandum to the service components highlighting the flexible authorities provided through the existing acquisition regulations and policy and directing them should those existing authorities be insufficient to enable a rapid response to request the use of rapid acquisition authority.

While the Department has enjoyed many successes in rapidly delivering capabilities to the field, there are still challenges to overcome. The most difficult challenge in rapid acquisition is not strictly acquisition, but rather prioritizing needs and quickly identifying the resources needed to execute a solution.

While Congress cannot help us with prioritizing our warfighting needs, it can help to facilitate their rapid funding. The increase of rapid acquisition authority has helped, but identifying new funding in the year of execution remains a challenge. On average, the Department must expect a reprogramming request to take 3 months from the decision to fund an urgent need until the funds are authorized. In preparing our troops in contact for an upcoming campaign, a 3-month delay in funding can be an unacceptably long period. The Department needs immediate access to the funds needed to initiate actions as the soon as the need is validated.

Our fiscal year 2011 budget submission included a \$300 million overseas contingency operation request and the fiscal year 2012 President's budget request includes \$100 million in the base budget and an additional \$100 million in the overseas contingency operations to provide immediate source of funding for urgent needs. While this money would not fully fund all of the Department's urgent needs, it would allow sufficient funds to initiate actions immediately while additional funds are requested through Congress. Your support of these requests is a critical part of our improved responsiveness.

As we have evolved our structures and processes and continually improved our responsiveness, we have recognized the value of many of the findings contained within the reports that your committee has sponsored over the past several years. While we have

embraced the need for focused senior leadership, as evidenced through the evolution of the Senior Integration Group, we are cautious not to allow the imperative to establish formal policy and process distract from the continual effort to rapidly field those capabilities identified by the operational commanders as urgent.

The changes made in section 803 of the fiscal year 2011 NDAA expanding the authority given to the Secretary are appreciated. I also believe that the review required by section 804 of the National Defense Authorization Act will also help as we strive to strike the appropriate balance between acceptable levels of programmatic and operational risks. Pending the outcome of that study, the Senior Integration Group will continue to function as the Department's senior level governance council as we develop and staff the permanent policy that will implement the guidance contained within the recent Quadrennial Defense Review to institutionalize rapid acquisition.

Thank you, again, for your opportunity to speak with you today. While we still have work to do, I believe that the Department is on a path towards developing a more agile and efficient management framework for responding rapidly to urgent needs. And I look forward to your questions.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Dee can be found in the Appendix on page 31.]

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

Mr. Solis.

**STATEMENT OF WILLIAM M. SOLIS, DIRECTOR, DEFENSE CAPABILITIES AND MANAGEMENT, GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE**

Mr. SOLIS. Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, members of the subcommittee, I appreciate the opportunity to be here today.

I had a detailed oral statement, but since a lot of the findings in the report that we are issuing today have been covered by both you and the ranking member, I am going to quickly summarize and maybe highlight a couple of things as we go forward.

You mentioned a number of the entities, numerous entities that are involved in this urgent needs process—I think there were 31—and also that a number were also involved in capability development, like counter-IED, the lack of senior involvement, the fact that there is no tracking process. But there were a couple of things that I just wanted to highlight going forward, and that is, in part of this tracking process, I think it is not only good to track through from the time the process begins validation, the validation process once it comes out of theater to the initial fielding, but also, how effective is that solution we have fielded to the warfighter? Is it being used as it was envisioned? I think also going forward, is this something that we might be able to use into the future, another combatant command might be able to use the technology or materiel solution that has been developed? So I think having that tracking system and evaluating the effectiveness of that weapons system would also be very, very good.

And finally, the only other point I want to make in terms of our report, as we pointed out, there are a lot of different entities involved. There is not a baseline policy in existence, and there is a

need for senior involvement. But also, we think there are some options for potentially consolidating some of these entities, and we laid out some of those options and both put the advantages and disadvantages in our report. And again, we made that recommendation that the Department explore those options, particularly the CMO [Chief Management Officer]. The Department has concurred with that. But I think going forward, that would be one thing that I would probably ask that the committee continue to observe, in terms of trying to come up with better processes, possibly through consolidation, that can help our warfighter get what he needs or she needs in the quickest possible manner.

That concludes what I have to say at this point. I will be glad to answer any questions that you or the members of the committee might have.

[The prepared statement of Mr. Solis can be found in the Appendix on page 39.]

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you very much.

As chairman, I almost always ask my questions last, hoping that someone else will ask them, so I don't have to.

Mr. Reyes has graciously yielded to Mr. Turner because Mr. Turner is on a tight time schedule.

Mr. Turner.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, Mr. Reyes.

I greatly appreciate that.

With the votes and the schedule we have had, I appreciate the panel's patience as we popped in and out.

And thank you, Mr. Chairman, for the opportunity.

Gentlemen, as you know, we are operating currently under a continuing resolution. That means Congress never finished its work; we never got our job done. So we have not even agreed on a document that will pay the bills of the military for this year. Just now we are debating and pushing forward a short-term continuing resolution, one that would just kick the ball forward for only two weeks with the hopes that ultimately we will come to resolution on how we will pay our bills for fiscal year 2011.

During the same time, in the environment we have coming out of Department of Defense continuing questions of looking to efficiencies and reductions and cost savings. And we are looking even now to the Congress discussing budget cuts, the Department of Defense for 2011, for fiscal year 2011, fiscal year 2012. And we have, then, this discussion on the urgent needs of the warfighter, emphasis on the word "urgent." And I know that every time we discuss budget reductions or the continuing resolution, we have to have the effect—understand the effect of what it does to DOD to have the uncertainty of not having one full year of spending approved. We have the uncertainty of cuts and efficiencies, and in all of these discussions, people say, but it won't affect the warfighter. But I think it does affect the warfighter. I think you probably think it affects the warfighter. And certainly I know it gives our men and women in uniform insecurity to know that we are looking at reductions in spending and even issues of not having an agreement on how to pay our bills.

I wondered if you could speak for a moment on your thoughts on the effects of a continuing resolution and its blanket of uncertainty that it provides as opposed to our finishing our work and giving you one full year of funding for Department of Defense as a picture and also, if you have any concerns as we go forward in discussing reductions in 2012 and how that might ultimately translate to effects to the warfighter. Someone?

And thank you, Mr. Chairman and Mr. Reyes, again.

Mr. DEE. Yes, sir. In my comments, I mention that the Department will always face unanticipated needs, and we will always have the need for adequate funding in an execution year in order to be able to resolve these unanticipated needs.

In some cases, the needs may have been anticipated. We may have put money in requested funds in the last year's—in the budget request for this year in order to be able to execute something that we knew was going to happen this year. There was an example given in the classified briefing that took place just before this about—and people are aware of Aerostats, the need for additional Aerostats. We had actually anticipated that need, and we had put funds—the Army had placed funds in their budget request within the fiscal year 2012 budget request for procurement of additional Aerostats that we just don't have access to.

So, in lieu of that, we have gone through a rather lengthy and a very large reprogramming request in order to attempt to get the funds for that. That reprogramming request is further complicated by the fact that there is not a fiscal year 2011 source. So included in that reprogramming request, where it is \$180 million worth of operations and maintenance requirements in order to continue to support some things that we have fielded and are in the process of fielding right now, without an fiscal year 2011 appropriation, there is no fiscal year 2011 source. As you know, O&M [operations and maintenance] is 1-year money, so we can't reach backwards into unobligated 2010 or 2009 funds. So we just don't have a source to move any additional money into fiscal year 2011 O&M accounts right now. So, at some stage in the not-too-distant future, some of these capabilities that we are pushing forward to the field are not going to be able to be funded any longer.

Now, will there be prioritization where we decide that, yes, we want to keep this particular system operating overseas and continue the analytical support for a particular system in lieu of doing something back here? That is very possibly the case. But it does have a fairly significant impact, both in terms of when we do manage to anticipate growing needs, anticipated needs that we have, in fact, put in the budget that we can't now get access to, which leads us to the reprogramming action and then also just on the O&M side, just the complete inability to be able to move any money into an O&M account.

Mr. SOLIS. We haven't looked at that directly, but I would say anytime you have uncertainty, whether it is in the budget or any program, in terms of trying to figure out where this money is going to come from is going to cause issues, if not for the warfighter but for potentially other programs from where you may draw that money out of, because you don't know where that money is going to come from to replace it. And it could ultimately have more of an

impact on programs that you have back here, as opposed to the warfighter, because they will try to find—the war fight is always a priority for the Department.

But in terms of what happens particularly when you don't know how much money you are going to have for a particular program, yes, it can have an effect on those particular programs.

Mr. TURNER. Thank you.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

Now my good friend and ranking member, Mr. Reyes.

Mr. REYES. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And, gentlemen, thank you for your testimony.

I have here one of the charts that was furnished to the committee. And I want to ask a question regarding the time frame that it represents. On this chart, it is titled the JUON process flow. It has got some time frames in there that I find rather lengthy in my opinion. It takes 14 days as the time required to triage one of these warfighter requests and then to forward to the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell. Then the second part of it takes 30 days as the time that it takes to get this same request to the next step, which is getting it to a military service or JIEDDO. And that is only the beginning of the process before something actually gets out in the field.

So the question I have is, why does it take 45 days to accomplish these two tasks? Is the problem a lack of people, a lack of funding, or is it a coordination issue? What can we do to speed up this process? And then is part of the issue that maybe it is slow because other entities in DOD don't cooperate with your group? So if you can comment on that, I would appreciate it, because to me it seems like it is too long a process.

Mr. DEE. Yes, sir. Those time lines that you cited, 14 days within the Joint Staff to validate the requirement and then 30 days in my shop in order to be able to do the assessments and task it out. Those are not measures of how long it takes. Those are objective goals that we try to stay within whenever possible.

Let me talk a little bit before I get to the specific time lines about what happens in those two processes. So what the Joint Staff does when they get a requirement from the operational commander, from the combatant commander, they work within their Functional Capability Boards to do two things: One, determine if it is a valid requirement, if there is any redundant activities going on or programs of record that could be accelerated in order to meet this requirement and then also to determine the level of urgency that something may have. So they are looking at it from a requirements perspective, working with the services through their Functional Capability Board to see what other activities may be going on in the Department that may be relevant with this, making sure going backwards with the combatant commander that they really understand what the requirement is.

When we get these joint urgent operational needs, it is not as if you are getting a capabilities development document or a capabilities production document with very strictly defined performance parameters and objectives and thresholds and such. They tend to come in as a much vaguer statement of requirement. So trying to figure out, and this is one of the most difficult points in this whole



urgent needs process is, what is good enough. So what is it that we are really going to be able to pursue?

Again, it is not we are going to build something to meet these performance parameters. We are going to try to identify something that can provide 80 percent of that requirement or 70 percent or whatever the commander determines is good enough. So there is a dialogue that goes back and forth, and that requirement should be viewed as somewhat fungible. And that is really what takes time on the Joint Staff process is to determine, so what is it really that you are looking for? How do we get down to the good-enough stage? And then they pass it to me.

Now, my part of it, similarly determining what is good enough, let us identify the potential solution set. They are looking at it from a requirements side; I am looking at it from a solution set side. Let us look at the potential solution set that we have got; what is actually executable in the near term? What is the technology maturity level of this particular thing they are asking for? What is the producability of this? What is it going to cost? Where is the money going to come from? So all of those things are what we are kind of working with in those two processes before they go out.

One of the things that we are doing at the moment that I mentioned, the Senior Integration Group that falls under Dr. Carter and General Neller, is we are trying to consolidate all of that. And we do have and have had now for quite a while regular video teleconferences with both CENTCOM and with the ISAF [International Security Assistance Force] Command and the USFOR-A [U.S. Forces-Army] Command to talk through these requirements and resolve as many of those things in one spot as we can to reduce the time that it takes to be able to push things out.

We have things that fly through the process in a number of days, single-digit number of days, and we have other things, depending on the complexity, largely when we can't find a quick solution, and we have a few examples of those, that the search for a solution before you task it to somebody becomes a drawn-out process and has gone in fact beyond 30 days on some occasions.

Mr. REYES. So I think what I am hearing you say is that these are optimum goals, for 14 days and 30 days, to get through these processes?

Mr. DEE. That is right. I wouldn't use the word "optimum." I would say that our optimum goals would be single-digit days, you know, 1 or 2 days in each spot. But the reality is it sometimes takes longer depending on the vagueness of the requirement and the complexity of a potential solution set. So we use those just to have a measurement, to have a target that at least we can measure ourselves against and be able to apply some metrics and see how well we are doing.

Mr. REYES. Do you track, statistically, do you track the average or of, say, 10 requests or 100 requests? Do you keep track of that kind of performance or not?

Mr. DEE. Sir, I am sure Mr. Solis will be willing to add to this.

Mr. REYES. I am going to ask him next.

Mr. DEE. Our metrics on this process are not as good as we like. I will say that upfront. So we do track the individual requirement from the time it comes in until it gets satisfied, until it is delivered

and satisfied. So we do track that. We do track the number of days it takes. We don't have a single consolidated database, authoritative database for doing that. But between the services, between Central Command, where most of these things come from, and the Joint Staff, all have databases that collectively provide that information. We don't have a nice, neat OSD level dashboard that will present the metrics that we would like to see. We would like that, but we are not quite there yet.

So we do track them individually, the individual items. As Mr. Solis I am sure will mention, it becomes when you are trying to roll up that data from so many different sources, it becomes very difficult to measure how well collectively you are doing within your process. We could identify with any particular requirement how well we have done. When you are trying to look at it collectively, it becomes somewhat difficult to get that more strategic level metric that says, yes, our process works great or it doesn't.

Mr. REYES. Okay. Mr. Solis.

Mr. SOLIS. I just add, you know, as a mention, they can look at maybe from the time elapsed until initial fielding, but I think you have got to look at everything in between. And one of the things that we talked about was funding and not just what gets reprogrammed. But I think one of the hang-ups is, where does the source of funding come from, even before you get to the reprogramming process?

And I think if you begin to start building it or breaking it down into the elements of where, what is happening, whether it is funding, whether it is in the acquisition process, then you can start to begin to look at where I should invest my time on these choke points. And I think that is the kind of thing that you really need to look at as you look through the process.

So, ultimately, you can say, okay, here is where we need to spend our time. Here is where we need to figure out a way to work through this so we can ultimately field that requirement, as soon as possible.

Mr. REYES. So somebody like an efficiency expert looking at this would find ways to greatly reduce the time?

Mr. SOLIS. I think, first, you have got to have the information data to say, where are your choke points? And I think even the Department I think a couple of years back had what they call a Lean Six Sigma team going in and do a look-see at that. And I think they began to identify where some of these choke points were. And I think that is the kind of thing that you then begin to figure out where your solutions, how you are going to deal with all of these issues, whether it is funding, whether it is the acquisition process or if you have got to go out and get an acquisition to satisfy that requirement.

Even the fielding process, sometimes, you know, if you are going to, like we were talking about before, up-armoring all vehicles as we did, you just can't pull all of the vehicles out in one day and just not—you know. That all takes time. So I think you need to have where all these—how long is it taking in general for whether it is a counter-IED solution, ISR, whatever, so that you have the information so that you can begin to make good management decisions.

Mr. REYES. I am not sure I like the answer.

But thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you both.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you. Now in order of the member's appearance on the committee, Ms. Hartzler.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Thank you, gentlemen. I read that the Congress has provided the Department with rapid acquisition authority to get things done quickly, but it has only been used four times since 2005. So can you explain a little bit about why that hasn't been used more? And what were the four times? What did they request?

Mr. DEE. Yes, ma'am. The report is a little dated now. Since that report was—the data was collected for that report, we did a few more rapid acquisition authorities. We just did one, which I mentioned in my statement, that the comptroller kind of honchoed or directed for \$116 million to cover multiple projects to be able to move money very quickly. In the past, those four that were referred to, two of them were CREW systems, counter, radio-controlled IED counter-measure systems, and the other two were ISR systems.

Mrs. HARTZLER. I am very interested, as I know many people are, in the IED problem that we have. And I see that we have invested \$19.7 billion so far to counter that, and there is 3,100 people working on that. I guess I would like a little bit more explanation of, what do they do? What do 3,100 people do, and what have we gotten for our money with the \$19.7 billion?

Mr. DEE. I will talk to some of that. I think you are referring to some numbers associated with prior reports in the Joint IED Defeat Organization. So let me talk a little bit about what we have gotten for the money and not talk so much about their organization, which I prefer to defer to their director. As was addressed in a classified briefing, IEDs are still the number one casualty over in Iraq. When the Joint IED Defeat Organization was stood up back in 2006, you didn't have a central focal point for counter-IED within the Department and, as importantly, you didn't have a fund that you could rapidly reach into in an execution year again in order to deliver capabilities.

So if you look at the capabilities that have been provided, it includes everything from CREW, which I just mentioned, counter-RCIED, electronic warfare, which pretty much very well mitigated the radio-controlled IED threat. It includes things like mine rollers. It includes various force protection capabilities, standoff explosive detection capabilities. So there is a whole range of things that would not have been fielded had it not been for an organization like JIEDDO and for the flexible appropriation they had been given since their startup. In terms of their internal organization, again, I will take the question and defer that to the director.

Mrs. HARTZLER. I know there have been some successes at it. I represent Fort Leonard Wood, and they have the engineering school there. And I was there about a month ago, and they were showing me some of the equipment that they are training their troops to use in order to try to help with this problem. But they also showed me some examples of some IEDs that are come back from Afghanistan, and the ingenuity of our enemy is just really hard to deal when they take a log and hollow it out and just have

plastic tubing in it and somehow—I don't remember if it was water or air to detonate it or something. But it makes it very, very, very difficult. So this is certainly something we have to continue to address.

I just hope that we have had a lot of success with the amount of money that we have invested in this. And do you feel confident that things are going well in this area, that we are making the headway in this prevention?

Mr. SOLIS. I will just take a shot at it. Just going back to your original question; what are these 3,100 people doing? Just, in general, there are three lines or three mission areas, as they call them. One is the attack network. One is defeat device, and the other one is training mission. One is dealing with materiel solutions, much of what we have talked about today. Another one is assisting the warfighter in providing information about the network of folks who are building or creating IEDs. And it is not necessarily an intel center, but it has maybe some of those—it looks like an intel center. And then there is a training mission about, as our troops are getting ready to deploy out to Iraq or Afghanistan, about how to deal with IEDs as they encounter them. I mean, that is sort of the broad three areas that they deal with.

I think one of the things we have talked about with JIEDDO and while there is no doubt there have been successes in terms of some of the fielding, we still don't have a real good sense—and this goes back to the thing that we are talking about today, about the effectiveness of all of the solutions—we can tell maybe on a one-on-one, but globally I don't think we still have that information out there. So while I think that the money has gone to a lot of good things, I think there are still questions about how effective are all of the solutions that have been provided? Are they meeting all of requirements of the warfighter, and are they effective, is this something we want to transfer into some other combatant command? I think all of those kinds of things are still up in the air.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Is there any consolidation of bringing together all of the processes and entities to centralize so these decisions are made in one place regarding all of these programs?

Mr. DEE. So there is not a decision to consolidate all of the organizations or bring everything under a single hat. That was a recommendation that was contained within the congressionally directed Defense Science Board Report in 2009 to create a rapid acquisition and fielding agency, give them a one-half percent of the Department's budget, set them aside and let them get on with it.

The difficulty with doing that is that almost relieves the rest of the Department from worrying about what the most immediate threats are. So what we are working to do and which I think we are being relatively successful at is getting the larger institution, the 90 percent of the building in the Department that is involved in the normal requirements, resources, programming and acquisition process, involved in the game. To do that, what we have done, instead of saying that now JIEDDO no longer exists, ISR task force no longer exists, MRAP task force, all these other guys, you are now one organization, we pulled their reporting chain under a single spot. And that is Dr. Carter's Senior Integration Group, which I addressed earlier, co-chaired by the J-3, General Neller. And

what that provides for us—and going back to an earlier question, what is the hard part of this is and what takes longer? The hardest part is getting everybody to accept that the requirement is a priority. If you have all of this coming to a central senior, very, very senior level decision point, that can say, yes, in fact, these are priorities, this particular requirement is a priority, and everybody from the requirements folks through the budgeting, the programming folks, the acquisition folks, all of the acquisition folk, the PM [Program Manager], the contracting officer, the head of the contracting activity, et cetera, et cetera, and to then go back out to the transportation community to be able to get something out into the field itself; once all of those entities are on the same sheet of music in terms of priorities and we can get the money there, then things tend to happen pretty well.

So the hardest part has been getting a common understanding of priorities. And I think what Dr. Carter is doing with the Secretary's permission through the SIG is going to provide that.

Mrs. HARTZLER. Thank you.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

Mr. Wilson.

Mr. WILSON. Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

And thank you for your efforts. I am actually encouraged. I had two of my oldest sons serve in Iraq, and in their service, I was really assured by the military leadership, but I always hoped, too, that UAVs [Unmanned Aerial Vehicles] would be overhead or some level of advanced technology.

And I share the concern of Congresswoman Hartzler, too, that we are dealing with a well-financed enemy, sadly a very determined, educated enemy. And so what you are doing is just so important to respond to technological challenges to our troops that are identified. And with that in mind, and I know that you are working with the warfighter to receive input from them, and are there mechanisms in place where—I have just gotten back from visiting with the troops in Iraq and Afghanistan. And if I had suggestions from them, I would like to present them to you, but also, is there a mechanism where they can communicate directly with your offices?

Mr. DEE. Yes, sir. We have many mechanisms for reaching back both into the services and to OSD and the Joint Staff, to identify new requirements to exchange ideas and such. Let me just talk real briefly some battle rhythm items. So depending on what level you are at, we have a biweekly civics secure VTC [Voice Teleconference] with the theater in order to discuss new technologies that may be emerging to allow them to take a look at these things. They all have—or certainly down at the brigade level, they have science and technology advisors that allow them to look at this. So from the upfront stuff, we have got new opportunities, technical opportunities that may be of value to you. We have that exchange through various VTCs and such. The Army's research and development and engineering command hosts a weekly VTC with many of the same players but further expanded that goes to all of the different RCs and the leadership of all of the RCs [Regional Commands]—not the leadership, but kind of the action officer, O-6 level within all of the RCs to sort of do the same thing, to review requirements, to review technical opportunities, to mitigate requirements, as well as just to

review the delivery of capabilities that may be going out there. At the senior-most level, Dr. Carter has every 2 to 3 weeks another forum where he has leadership of USFOR-A, ISAF and the different codes, the different RCs, the Intelligence folks, everybody, CENTCOM, ourselves, the Joint Staff and everybody in the building that is participating in this thing. So we have lots of venues for exchanging information, somewhat informally, but at least to make sure everybody understands the state of play both in terms of what may be available with technical opportunities as well as requirements.

On the requirements side, there are multiple venues for identifying your requirements as well. Of course, the informal thing kind of kicks it off, but more formally, depending on the service, depending on the type of need that you have, we have this JUONs process that we are talking about it if it is a joint need, also in a lot of cases if it is a very technically difficult problem to solve. But the Army has what they call an operational needs statement process. The Marine Corps has a process. The Navy and the Air Force all have processes that through their component commands they can submit requirements that then get vetted through their services, again with OSD providing oversight of that and some visibility over the kinds of things that they are doing.

Mr. WILSON. Another resource, we have very creative people in our country, such as the chairman of the subcommittee, who himself has numerous patents and has been a person who has been a visionary on different issues.

And we have constituents come to us with very enterprising, entrepreneurial, helpful suggestions. Should we direct them to you, or who should we direct innovators to?

Mr. DEE. Sir, you can always direct them to us or to me, and we can put them in touch with the right folks. There are lots of opportunities for industry and folks who have got ideas to participate in our process. And each service and organization has a slightly different ways of soliciting inputs, but we do go through broad agency announcements. We do requests for information, requests for proposals. JIEDDO has a rolling process that anybody can get on the site and look and see what kind of capabilities they are looking for and submit proposals.

If there is something more specific that they have got which there may not be a solicitation out there for at all, we are more than happy to take a look at it. Of course OSD doesn't execute anything, so we would refer to one of the services that has got responsibility for that particular capability area.

Mr. WILSON. Again, I want to thank you.

And 10 years ago, I was at the National Training Center in Desert Warfare training with the Army National Guard, and I like to point out that the equipment I have is now 5 generations removed, and I say that complimentary. So thank you very much for your efforts.

Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

We will have several questions for the record. I just have three brief questions before we recess the committee.

Mr. Dee, we understand that DOD is developing new guidance for its urgent needs process to be issued in a directive-type memorandum. When do you expect this new guidance to be issued?

Mr. DEE. Sir, I told the GAO in response to the report in March of 2010 that that directive was forthcoming, and I think we are now a year later, and I don't have it. But what has happened in that interim period, again, was the evolution of the Senior Integration Group. We are now codifying decisions that the Secretary has made in regards to using the Senior Integration Group as the single senior leadership point decisionmaker for the Department. We are codifying that in a directive-type memorandum.

I would like to give you a specific date when it will be done, but given the coordination process within the Department, it could be anywhere between a month and 4 months from now.

Mr. BARTLETT. Okay. The next question. Does DOD have a visibility over how well urgent needs solutions are performing? If so, has the Department performed analysis of this data, and what are the results of any such analysis?

Mr. DEE. Sir, again, the execution happens at many different levels of these various processes. Each entity, each component that executes these urgent needs processes has an assessment process in place. We have multiple, both the Army's Test and Evaluation Command and the Marine Corps' Operational Test and Evaluation Command have folks overseas in theater that do operational assessments or capability limitations assessments of systems that have been fielded. They distribute surveys of the users of these things to try to get an idea of how well they are using.

JIEDDO does something similar, also leveraging the ATEC [Army Test and Evaluation Command] efforts but also using some of their own folks to do assessments both before things are deployed but, as importantly or even more importantly, while they are deployed to figure out what the operational effectiveness of this stuff is.

So, within each of those entities, there is an organization that manages these assessments that provide to the operational users in order to determine if what we did think was good enough is in fact good enough to mitigate the particular capability gap. All of those reports—and I think in ATEC's case, it is about 166 reports they have done in the past 18 months or so on urgently fielded requirements. Those are all available on the various component Web sites within the Department. They are not necessarily rolled up into a single spot.

But the folks who are stakeholders in those particular capabilities, whether from the acquisition side, the requirements side or from the operational user overseas, they do have access to that. And those reports, as well as the service that they do, then inform any changes to the requirements that they may have, which may be a modification to a JUON. It may be the rescission of a JUON, or it may be the submission of a whole new JUON, because what we thought was going to work just plain didn't work and we are starting over again.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

Mr. Solis, you said that in addition to lacking comprehensive guidance, DOD does not have a senior-level focal point for urgent needs. Why is it so important that DOD have such a focal point?

Mr. SOLIS. It sounds like they are going to have a senior focal point, based on what I heard today. But I think it is important because you need somebody who can go between all of the different offices, and we mentioned all of the different entities that are involved in the urgent needs process. Without that senior leadership—and we have seen that in other areas of counterterrorism, business transformation, contracting and contingencies, that when you have senior leadership—and I mean senior leadership at the AT&L level, which we are talking about in this case, I think that is going to help make things move different things through the process. Whether it be funding, whether it gets hung up for some other reason, I think that senior leadership can step in and make things happen.

I think the most extreme example of that is the MRAP. When Secretary Gates said, we want to make this happen, it happened. I am not saying that the Secretary can do that at every time. But when you do have that senior leadership involvement, it can help facilitate and move things in ways that haven't been even thought of.

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Reyes, do you have any additional questions?

Mr. REYES. I was just going to mention, although we are focused on challenges, are there some good news stories out there of things that we were able to deploy very quickly, capabilities that were asked for that we were able to get them out—kind of give you a shot at a good news story that you can comment on?

Mr. DEE. Yes, sir. Thank you for that opportunity.

But, yes, I think we do have lots of good news stories. Some of them were briefed at the classified briefing that happened beforehand. But we can mention the Aerostats, and you saw the effect that those are having, and that was a very quick turnaround on a very large, complex program that not the least part of the complexity being the fielding of those capabilities and actually getting them to all of these remote sites and getting them set up, which was a very difficult challenge.

But if you look at—MRAP was mentioned already; MATV [MRAP–All Terrain Vehicle] mentioned already, all of those things. A lot of the counter-IED equipment, the CREW equipment, which has largely mitigated what was a very serious threat not many years ago. A lot of these things are tremendously good news stories. We have—although not a rapid acquisition fielding agency, not everything coming through a single office, between the components, the various task forces that we have and that have stood up over the years, we have pushed a lot of good stuff over into the field. And I said in my statement that we believe that our Forces have got the best force protection, counter-IED, ISR, C2 [Command and Control] capabilities in the world. A lot of that has been developed through these urgent processes. And we believe that sincerely that they do have that.

We think there is still a ways to go. We are always looking for better technologies and better capabilities to provide to them. But we do think that given in your opening statement, putting the im-



perative on the speed to get things over there, rather than on the risks associated with the traditional cost schedule and performances, we think we have had some successes since the early days of this war.

Mr. REYES. Good.

Thank you, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. BARTLETT. Thank you.

I have but one brief question before we adjourn the committee. I hope you will humor me in a little poll that I am conducting. This has to be one of the most asymmetric wars in the history of the world. If you will take a piece of paper, without consulting with your colleague, and write down a number when I ask you for it and then read that number back to me. For every dollar that they spend on IEDs, how many dollars do we spend in response, like MRAPs and mine rollers and ISR and JIEDDO and just an educated guess? Write that number down.

Mr. SOLIS. Sir, again, the question is how much do you think—

Mr. BARTLETT. For every dollar they spend for putting an IED out there on the road or out in the field, how many dollars have we spent in response to that, including things like MRAPs and JIEDDO and the whole gamut of things, the little dirigibles that are up there that are surveilling them, the pilotless aircraft.

Okay. Mr. Dee, your number?

Mr. DEE. Sir, this may be low-balling it, but I think it is probably at least 1,000 to 1.

Mr. BARTLETT. I was wondering whether it was closer to a 1,000 to 1 or a million to 1.

Mr. Solis?

Mr. SOLIS. I had put 1,000 to 1.

Mr. BARTLETT. You put 1,000 to 1.

Okay. Thank you very much for my little poll. Thank you very much for your testimony. And we will submit some questions for the record. We would appreciate you responding to that. We now stand in adjournment.

[Whereupon, at 5:13 p.m., the subcommittee was adjourned.]



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# **A P P E N D I X**

MARCH 1, 2011

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**PREPARED STATEMENTS SUBMITTED FOR THE RECORD**

MARCH 1, 2011

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**Statement of Chairman Roscoe G. Bartlett (R–Maryland)**  
**House Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces**  
**Hearing on**  
**Equipping the Warfighter in Afghanistan**  
**March 1, 2011**

The Tactical Air and Land Forces Subcommittee meets today to receive testimony on Department of Defense processes and procedures currently used to rapidly respond to, and fulfill urgent warfighter capability requirements. These urgently required capabilities are defined by the Department of Defense as capabilities that if left unfulfilled, usually within days or weeks, could result in the loss of life and/or prevent the successful completion of a near-term military mission.

We just received a classified briefing on equipping U.S. forces in Afghanistan and learned of the current capabilities being used by the warfighter as well as what the warfighter currently requires.

We want to make sure that the processes are in place or get put in place to get our warfighters the equipment they need as quickly as they can get that equipment.

The Department's record in quickly getting needed capability to the warfighter has not been what it should have been. This was most evidenced in the Department's slow response to the improvised explosive device threat. On the other end of the spectrum of responsiveness is the Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle program, which shows what can be done when the Department of Defense partners with industry.

We believe we have now fielded the best warfighter equipment available, but as long as we have injuries in the field, we must continue to do everything possible to better protect our people.

With 147,000 service men and women operating in Iraq and Afghanistan, it is our mission to ensure they are provided with the most effective equipment available, in a timely manner, and not repeat previous mistakes.

There have been numerous studies and reports by independent and government agencies that have all cited inefficiencies in the Department's ability to rapidly respond to warfighter capability requirements.

The GAO notes that currently, multiple entities in the Department of Defense reported a role in responding to similar categories of urgently needed capabilities: 5 entities have a role in responding to counter-IED capabilities, 8 entities have a role in responding to ISR capabilities, and 6 entities have a role in responding to command, control, communications, and computer capabilities.

The committee is aware of an urgent request that was made last July by U.S. Forces in Afghanistan for advanced analytic capability to analyze the tremendous amounts of

intelligence information. The request stated: "This shortfall translates into operational opportunities missed and lives lost." Further this specific capability was described by an intelligence officer in Afghanistan as "causing U.S. forces' ability to find insurgent targets to skyrocket."

The specific capability was off the shelf. It already was being used by 30 separate units and agencies in Afghanistan and here in the U.S. When our committee Chairman and Ranking Member wrote the Department in October, 3 months after the request had been made, asking why this capability was being delayed, it was determined the request had not even yet made it to Washington. Additional platforms are only now being fielded in limited numbers while the fielding of the promised program of record capability has slipped from November of last year to the end of this month.

The committee is also aware that due to the large number of services', agencies', and organizations' failure to use common databases for these urgent requests, duplication occurs in responding to urgent requests. In one instance an agency spent million-of-dollars doing a proof of concept on an off-the-shelf rotorcraft Unmanned Aerial Vehicle that was already being used by another service.

According to the GAO, the Department does not comprehensively manage and oversee its urgent needs efforts; overlap and duplication exists in the Department's urgent needs efforts; and several challenges, such as funding, training, and technology maturity of proposed solutions, could hinder the Department's responsiveness to urgent needs in the future.

We recognize the Department has taken steps to create urgent needs processes that are more responsive to urgent warfighter requests than traditional acquisition procedures. Yet, the Department has been at this for 10 years and very clearly much needs to be done in establishing an institutionalized capability and process.

Congress has given the Department of Defense Rapid Acquisition Authority. This authority allows for the rapid acquisition and deployment of equipment that is urgently needed to eliminate a combat capability gap that has resulted in combat fatalities. The subcommittee strongly encourages the Department to utilize this authority and believes the Department could improve employment of it and better inform decisionmakers within the Department that this authority exists.

Over the past 5 years, the Department has only used this authority 4 times. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) released a report today that is critical of the Department's processes and makes several recommendations for improvements. I would hope the Department will expeditiously implement these recommendations. We are prepared to help with those initiatives.

Finally, I again want to ensure the men and women in uniform and their families that they are being provided the best possible equipment available, in a timely manner. While it appears the process is inefficient and duplicative, it has provided the best equipment available, to our warfighter.



**Statement of Ranking Member Silvestre Reyes (D–Texas)**  
**House Subcommittee on Tactical Air and Land Forces**  
**Hearing on**  
**Equipping the Warfighter in Afghanistan**  
**March 1, 2011**

- Today’s hearing covers the critical topic of how the Department of Defense fills urgent warfighter needs from the field.
- This subcommittee has always operated in a bipartisan manner that focuses on the needs of troops in the field, so I want to commend Chairman Bartlett on having this vital issue be the subject of our first hearing for the year.
- For the purposes of providing oversight to DOD and the military services on this issue, I think the subcommittee must focus on two key areas.
- One issue is the “efficiency” of responding to the operational needs of warfighters in a way that avoids wasting money.
- While efficiency is important and is always something we have to focus on, I think it comes in a distant second to the other critical issue: the *speed* of DOD’s responses to urgent operational needs in the field.
- To me, this is the overriding issue we face because getting a capability into the hands of a soldier—*even if it isn’t the perfect solution or the most affordable*—can save lives.
- We saw this with the process DOD went through to get MRAPs in the field.
- In the end, it took Congress and Secretary Gates constantly pushing to get these life-saving vehicles deployed. That should not have been the case.
- But, after reading GAO’s testimony on this issue for today’s hearing, I am not entirely sure the Defense Department and the military services have fully learned the lessons they should have from the MRAP program.
- While I have no doubt that servicemembers and civilians at the Pentagon are doing the very best they can to act quickly, and that much very good work is done every day, it appears that the *system* for responding to urgent needs is overly complex, bureaucratic, and slow.

- GAO identified at least *30 different organizations* in the Department of Defense involved in responding to these urgent operational needs.
- They also point out that *no single, high-ranking individual* is in charge—this is a critical lesson learned from the MRAP program.
- Given the massive amounts of funding involved—at least \$76 billion since 2005—and the urgency of the needs, it is not acceptable to have the level of “fragmentation and overlap” GAO found.
- In addition to understanding what needs to happen within DOD, today’s hearing will hopefully also help the subcommittee identify where Congress can act to improve the system, whether through changes in how we provide funding or the authorities given to the military services. This needs to be a team effort between Congress and DOD.
- Chairman Bartlett, thank you again for calling this hearing on this critical issue, and I look forward to working with you on this topic as we build the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2012.

**HOLD UNTIL RELEASED  
BY THE HOUSE COMMITTEE  
ON ARMED SERVICES**

**STATEMENT OF**

**MR. THOMAS P. DEE**

**DIRECTOR, JOINT RAPID ACQUISITION CELL**

**OFFICE OF THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
(ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY AND LOGISTICS)**

**BEFORE THE  
HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE  
Tactical Air and Land Subcommittee**

**March 1, 2011**

**HOLD UNTIL RELEASED  
BY THE HOUSE COMMITTEE  
ON ARMED SERVICES**

Chairman Bartlett, Ranking Member Reyes, and Members of the Tactical Air and Land Subcommittee:

Thank you for the opportunity to appear before you today to discuss the Department of Defense's (DoD) Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) process.

The experience of war has taught us that new enemy weapons and tactics will emerge in times of conflict and that we will not always have existing capability or capacity to adequately counter those new threats. From the "torpedoes" of Mobile Bay and mustard gas in Flanders to the German wolf packs of the North Atlantic and the Air Defense system of North Vietnam, our nation has routinely faced unexpected threats that have required urgent responses. The underlying purpose of the Department's JUONs process is to rapidly provide our warfighters with the capabilities they need to address new and evolving threats and opportunities.

While it is impossible to anticipate every emerging threat on the battlefield, the accelerating pace of technology development and commercial innovation provides DoD with an opportunity to rapidly develop and field new capabilities to counter each threat and ensure that the decision cycle advantage remains with our forces, regardless of whether we were prescient enough to anticipate each emerging threat or each technology opportunity during previous budget cycles.

As is the case for our deliberate requirements and resource allocation processes – the Joint Capabilities Integration and Development System (JCIDS), Planning, Programming, Budgeting and Execution System (PPBES), and acquisition processes – the JUONs process is comprised of three main elements: (1) deciding what you need (requirements); (2) providing adequate resources to buy it (programming and budgeting); and (3) assessing alternatives and executing a solution (acquisition), to include operation and maintenance. A fourth step, fielding (including logistics, training, sustainment, and in some cases testing), is also vitally important to address, since this can be the limiting factor in a contingency situation and will shape elements (1) through (3).

The challenge for the JUONs process is how to execute each element on a much more compressed timeline, often in the absence of well-defined requirements, supporting CONOPS and doctrine, and/or supporting operations and maintenance concepts. As we compress our timelines to satisfy urgent needs, the Department necessarily accepts some higher level of programmatic (cost, schedule, performance) risk in order to reduce the Commander's operational risk. At a time of war, "schedule" often becomes the risk that is least acceptable because the speed at which something can be fielded, even if it is only a mitigating capability, is often the most relevant factor in reducing the Commander's operational risk. Not surprisingly, therefore, the Commander's assessment of his operational risk is where the urgent needs process begins.

As identified in a recent GAO study<sup>1</sup>, there are multiple mechanisms through which a Commander can submit an urgent operational need request. Appropriately, under their Title 10 responsibilities, the

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<sup>1</sup> GAO-10-460 April 2010, Warfighter Support: Improvements to DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Would Enhance Oversight and Expedite Efforts to Meet Critical Warfighter Needs, pg 9.

Service components have all established processes to facilitate a timely response to identified warfighter needs<sup>2</sup>. Additionally, US Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) and the Joint IED Defeat Organization (JIEDDO) have written policies and processes for managing urgent needs<sup>3</sup>. While the Army alone has handled over 10,000 such operational needs statements, all Services have responded to urgent operational needs through their service-specific rapid acquisition processes.

In cases where a Commander identifies the need as joint, the Combatant Commander certifies the requirement and forwards it to the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff for validation as a Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON)<sup>4</sup>. There have been more than 300 such needs forwarded by US Central Command (CENTCOM) to the Joint Staff for validation since 2006. The Joint Staff Director for Force Structure, Resources and Assessments (J8) uses its established Functional Capability Boards (FCBs) to assess both the validity and urgency of the requirement. As part of their review, the FCBs consider whether the requirement has already been identified through some other means (Integrated Priority List, JCIDS, etc.), whether funding has been programmed or requested, whether a non-material solution might be sufficient, and whether there may be overlap with other efforts within the Department. Should the Joint Staff J8 Deputy Director for Requirements (DDR) determine that the need is valid and that it is urgent<sup>5</sup>, he passes it to me as the Director of the OSD Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC).

The JRAC was established by the Deputy Secretary of Defense in 2004 to facilitate the resolution of immediate warfighter needs. As such, we coordinate with the Service Components, JIEDDO, the Intelligence Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR) Task Force, other elements of OSD including the offices of the Assistant Secretary of Defense Research and Engineering (ASD R&E) and Logistics and Material Readiness (ASD L&MR), and various defense agencies to identify potential solutions to the validated requirement and any challenges, or risks, associated with executing that solution. We then formally task the appropriate component with the responsibility to satisfy the need.

As I indicated earlier, there are many challenges associated with compressing the requirements, budgeting and acquisition cycle. While some solutions may be relatively straightforward, such as procuring additional commercially available optics suites, or commercial satellite communications systems, in other cases, they can be more complex, such as a current effort to engineer multiple mature

<sup>2</sup> U.S. Army, *Material Development*, Army Regulation 71-9, December 28, 2009; U.S. Navy, *Dept of the Navy Urgent Needs Process*, SECNAVNOTE 5000, March 12, 2009; USMC, *Marine Corps Expeditionary Force Development System*, MCO 3900.17, October 17, 2008; USAF, *Rapid Response Process*, USAF instruction 63-114, June 12 2008.

<sup>3</sup> USSOCOM, *Special operations Forces Capabilities and Development System*, USSOCOM Directive 71-4 (draft) June 2009. DOD Directive 2000.19 (Joint IED Defeat Organization) February 14, 2006 (under revision).

<sup>4</sup> Joint Urgent Operational Need (JUON) – An urgent operational need identified by a combatant commander involved in an ongoing named operation. A JUON's main purpose is to identify and subsequently gain Joint Staff validation and resourcing solution, usually within days or weeks, to meet a specific high priority combatant commander need. The scope of a combatant commander JUON will be limited to addressing urgent operational needs that: (1) fall outside of the established Service processes; and (2) most importantly, if not addressed immediately, will seriously endanger personnel or pose a major threat to ongoing operations.

<sup>5</sup> The guiding policy for the development, submission and validation of a JUON is contained in CJCS Instruction 3470.1. (currently under revision)

technologies to develop a new weapons system that minimizes collateral effects, or to find a rapid solution to the physics challenge of detecting homemade explosives from a safe stand-off range. Almost all solutions have complex integration challenges to enable interoperability with existing systems and most require non-standard training, or even doctrinal changes.

Despite these challenges, through our urgent needs processes, the Department has provided our forces with the best force protection, command and control, counter-IED and ISR capabilities available. That is not to say that the Department is satisfied with our processes, with the speed at which we can field new capabilities, at our ability to anticipate the next threat, or with the efficiency with which the whole process works. In the 2010 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), the Department recognized a continuing need to build agile, adaptive, and innovative structures capable of quickly identifying emerging gaps and rapidly adjusting program and budgetary priorities to mitigate those gaps<sup>6</sup>. Our urgent processes must provide a means of quickly prioritizing and quantifying requirements and of ensuring that the resources are available to enable rapid fielding of capabilities inside of the Department's PPBES cycle.

The Department has also acknowledged, and largely concurred with, the findings and recommendations of the April 2010 GAO report on DoD's Urgent Needs processes. Contained in that report are recommendations that DoD implement a comprehensive management framework with better defined accountability to improve our responsiveness to urgent operational needs. Section 804 of the FY 11 National Defense Authorization Act further directs the Department to conduct a complete review of the process for fielding capabilities in response to urgent operational needs to include consideration of earlier GAO reports and a July 2009 congressionally-directed study by the Defense Science Board Task Force on Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs. That review is to consider a streamlined and tightly integrated approach to the Department's urgent needs processes, clear definition of the roles and responsibilities within the department for the fulfillment of urgent needs, and the development of an expedited review process to determine which needs are appropriate for a rapid fielding process.

Concurrent with the development of these many reports, the Department has also been adapting its urgent processes in response to our experiences in Iraq and Afghanistan. Beginning in 2009, the President's revised strategy in Afghanistan has served as a catalyst to initiate, if not fully implement, many of the actions recommended in the GAO reports. Among the common findings of many of these reports is the perceived lack of a common management framework and clear senior leadership of our urgent needs processes. Recognizing the need for improved synergies among the multiple organizations that contribute to the counter-IED campaign, the Secretary of Defense established the Counter-IED Senior Integration Group (C-SIG) in November 2009 to leverage the efforts of JIEDDO, the military services, the defense agencies, the MRAP Task Force and the ISR Task Force. Under the leadership of Under Secretary of Defense (AT&L) Ashton Carter, and the Joint Staff Director of Operations (J3) Lt. Gen. Jay Paxton, the C-SIG provided clear priorities and common focus in the Counter-IED fight.

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<sup>6</sup> Quadrennial Defense review report, February 2010, pp 80-81.

It quickly became clear, however, that counter-IED is not a strictly confined problem set. Multiple capabilities ranging from ISR to force protection contribute to a successful C-IED campaign. Under USD(AT&L) Carter's leadership and with the Secretary's consent, the C-SIG has evolved to include oversight of many of the most critical urgent needs of our operational Commanders. While this evolved role of the C-SIG does not yet enjoy the clarity of a written policy directive, this senior governance board provides Department-wide focus on expediently meeting the urgent needs of our Commanders.

A recent organizational change indicative of this improved senior leader focus was the realignment of my office, the Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, from the Rapid Fielding Directorate of the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Research and Engineering (ASD R&E), to a direct report to the USD (AT&L). This organizational change has streamlined the decision process for those urgent needs submitted by the operational Commanders and validated by the Joint Staff. For example, multiple urgent needs that had been identified since the beginning of this fiscal year had been languishing for lack of funding. With his direct involvement in the process, USD(AT&L) Carter was able to quickly bring the issue to the attention of Secretary Gates, who convened a meeting of the Department's leadership and made a decision to immediately fund and execute these urgent needs. Within the authorities available to the Department, \$350M was quickly realigned to support those critical needs that could be executed within 60 days. An additional \$1B of requirements was also quickly sourced, but since the Department did not have the authority to reapportion these funds, a prior notification reprogramming request was submitted to Congress for approval. While the HASC has yet to act on this request, both appropriation committees have approved all of the requested additions. Unfortunately, due to the Department acting without an FY11 appropriation, the Department lacks an FY11 source to support the requested urgent Operation and Maintenance (O&M) requirements. Nevertheless, this action demonstrates the Department's commitment, at the very highest levels, to quickly make the decisions necessary to respond to warfighter requirements.

Another example of improved focus on urgent needs is the increased use of the Rapid Acquisition Authority provided in section 811 of the Ronald W. Reagan National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2005 (Public Law 108-375) and further amended this year. Use of this authority is identified as an interest item in the HASC Oversight Agenda for the 112<sup>th</sup> Congress, and I would like to take this opportunity to thank the committee for its action in the FY 11 NDAA in expanding this authority to include supplies as well as equipment and, more importantly, for expanding the authority from \$100M to \$200M per fiscal year. The Department has already made use of this expanded authority and used \$116M as part of the aforementioned decision by the Secretary to immediately fund those most urgent and executable needs.

As our management framework continues to evolve, our processes and policies must ensure that all Components place appropriate priority and use all available authorities to deliver timely and effective capabilities to meet the urgent needs of our Operational Commanders. To that end, in March 2010, USD(AT&L) Carter issued a memorandum to the Service components highlighting the flexible authorities provided through the existing acquisition regulations and policy and directing them, should

those existing authorities be insufficient to enable a rapid response, to request use of Rapid Acquisition Authority.

While the Department has enjoyed many successes in rapidly delivering capabilities to the field, there are still challenges to overcome. As I indicated earlier, the most difficult challenge in “rapid acquisition” is not acquisition, but rather prioritizing needs and quickly identifying the resources needed to execute a solution. Congress cannot help us with prioritizing our warfighting needs, but it can help to facilitate their rapid funding. The increase of Rapid Acquisition Authority has helped, but identifying new funding in the year of execution remains a challenge. Since the exhaustion of the Iraqi Freedom Fund (IFF)<sup>7</sup>, the Department has had no appropriation, except for counter-IED and MRAP, dedicated to support urgent needs in the year of execution. Over the past 18 months, this lack of immediately available funds has led to eight requests for reprogramming a total of \$3.4B<sup>8</sup>. While the Department appreciates the support Congress has largely provided on these requests, every day that funding authority is delayed results in a day’s delay in fielding the capability. Of interest, the time for Congressional approval of an urgent need reprogramming during this period has ranged from 7 to 72 days with the average being about 40 days. This is exclusive of the 30-day average it takes for the Department to identify the sources and prepare the submission. On average, the Department must expect a reprogramming request to take three months from the decision to fund an urgent need until the funds are authorized. In preparing our troops in contact for an upcoming campaign, a three-month delay in funding can be an unacceptably long period. The Department needs immediate access to the funds needed to initiate actions as soon as a need is validated.

The FY11 budget submission included a \$300M Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) request and the FY12 President’s Budget Request includes \$100M in the base budget and an additional \$100M in the OCO to provide an immediate source of funding for urgent needs. While this money would not fully fund all of the Department’s urgent needs, it would allow sufficient funds to initiate actions immediately while additional funds are requested through Congress. Your support of these requests is a critical part of our improved responsiveness.

Over the course of the past 9 ½ years, the Department has continually improved its responsiveness to unanticipated urgent operational needs. As we have evolved our structures and processes, we have recognized the value of many of the findings contained within the reports that your committee has sponsored over the past several years. While we have embraced the need for focused senior leadership – as evidenced through the evolution of the C-SIG – we are cautious not to allow the imperative to establish formal policy and process distract from the continual effort to rapidly field those capabilities identified by the operational Commanders as urgent. The changes made in Section 803 of the FY11

<sup>7</sup> From FY 2005 through FY 2008 (between May 2005 and Aug 2008), \$442.5M was made available from FY2005, FY2006, and FY2007 Iraqi Freedom Fund appropriations to support Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs).

<sup>8</sup> Joint Urgent Operational Needs (FY 09-28 PA); Helicopter Survivability (FY 10-02-R2-PA); Joint Urgent Operational Needs (FY 10-03-R-PA); Counter Improvised Explosive Device Requirements (C-SIG) (FY 10-12 PA); Wide Area Surveillance (WAS) Capability (FY 10-16 PA) Urgent Theater Requirements – Group A; (FY 10-23 PA) Urgent Theater Requirements – Group B (FY 10-24 PA); JUONs and ISR TF (FY 11-10 PA).



NDAA expanding the authority given to the Secretary are appreciated. I also believe that the review required by Section 804 of the FY11 NDAA will be helpful as we strive to strike the appropriate balance between acceptable levels of programmatic and operational risk. Pending the outcome of that study, the C-SIG will continue to function as the Department's senior level governance council while we develop and staff the permanent policy that will implement the guidance contained in the recent Quadrennial Defense Review to institutionalize rapid acquisition.

Thank you again for the opportunity to speak with you today. While we still have work to do, I believe the Department is on the path towards developing a more agile and efficient management framework for responding rapidly to urgent needs.

I look forward to your questions.



**THOMAS P. DEE**

Director, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell  
Office of the Under Secretary of Defense  
Acquisition, Technology and Logistics

Mr. Tom Dee, a native of New York City, was appointed to the Senior Executive Service and assumed responsibilities as Director, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell, in Mar 2009. He is responsible for overseeing the resolution of immediate warfighting needs as identified by the Defense Department's Combatant Commanders. Working with all of the Defense Department's components, he facilitates resolution of issues associated with identifying potential solutions to validated urgent needs, providing necessary resources to execute that solution, ensuring a responsive acquisition structure to develop and procure the solution and, finally, ensuring a sound logistic support concept is in place to enable operations and resolve the urgent need.

Prior to assuming this post, he served in the United States Navy from March 1980 until his retirement in Jan 2007. He held a variety of world-wide leadership positions spanning operations Desert Storm, SFOR and KFOR in the Balkans, and the ongoing Operations New Dawn and Enduring Freedom. In Washington, he served on the SECNAV's USS Cole Task Force, the Joint IED Defeat Task Force / Organization, and as the CNO's Requirements and Resource Sponsor for Expeditionary Force Protection capabilities including EOD, Naval Coastal Warfare, and Navy non-lethal weapons. He culminated his Naval career as Commanding Officer, Naval EOD Technology Division in Indian Head, Maryland where he was responsible for executing science and technology, acquisition, and information programs for the joint service EOD community and providing material and information support to operations in Iraq and Afghanistan.

Following his Navy career, Mr. Dee assumed responsibilities as the Defense Department's first Director of Defense Biometrics within the Office of the Secretary of Defense. On behalf of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, Research and Engineering, he executes Secretary of Defense Principal Staff Assistant responsibilities for oversight of all aspects of the DOD biometrics enterprise. Among his priorities is institutionalizing the capabilities enabled through the use of biometrics technologies throughout the range of military missions while continuing to meet the biometrics requirements of nation's military Commanders to support the ongoing wars.

Mr. Dee holds a Master of Sciences Degree (National Resource Strategy) from the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, National Defense University; a Master of Arts Degree (International Relations) from University of Southern California; and a Bachelor of Arts Degree (History) from New York University.

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United States Government Accountability Office

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GAO

Testimony

Before the Subcommittee on Tactical Air  
and Land Forces, Committee on Armed  
Services, House of Representatives

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For Release on Delivery  
Expected at 3:15 p.m. EST  
Tuesday, March 1, 2011

## WARFIGHTER SUPPORT

### DOD Should Have a More Comprehensive Approach for Addressing Urgent Warfighter Needs

Statement of William M. Solis, Director  
Defense Capabilities and Management



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GAO-11-417T

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Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the challenges that the Department of Defense (DOD) faces in fulfilling urgent operational needs identified by our warfighters. Over the course of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan, U.S. forces have encountered changing adversarial tactics, techniques, and procedures, which challenged DOD to quickly develop and provide new equipment and new capabilities to address evolving threats. Further, U.S. troops faced shortages of critical items, including body armor, tires, and batteries. DOD's goal is to provide solutions as quickly as possible to meet urgent warfighter needs to prevent mission failure or loss of life. To meet its urgent needs, DOD had to look beyond traditional acquisition procedures, expand the use of existing processes, and develop new processes and entities designed to be as responsive as possible to urgent warfighter requests. In addition to requests for equipment from DOD's existing stocks, warfighters have requested new capabilities, such as: technology to counter improvised explosive devices (IED); technology related to intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR) to provide increased situational awareness; and equipment related to command and control to enhance operations on the battlefield. In meeting urgent needs, it is important for DOD to efficiently use the department's financial resources. DOD has spent billions of dollars over the past several years to address urgent warfighter needs. Our past work on weapons acquisition has shown that the department has often pursued more programs than its resources can support.<sup>1</sup> Additionally, our past work also has shown that DOD has had difficulty translating needs into programs, which often has led to cost growth and delayed delivery of needed capabilities to the warfighter.

Today, we are publicly releasing a report that addresses (1) what entities exist within DOD for responding to urgent operational needs, and the extent to which there is fragmentation, overlap, or duplication; (2) the extent to which DOD has a comprehensive approach for managing and overseeing its urgent needs activities; and (3) the extent to which DOD has evaluated the potential for consolidations of its various activities and

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<sup>1</sup>GAO, *Defense Acquisition: DOD's Requirements Determination Process Has Not Been Effective in Prioritizing Joint Capabilities*, GAO-08-1060 (Washington, D.C.: Sept. 25, 2008).

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entities.<sup>2</sup> My statement will first briefly discuss challenges we reported in April 2010<sup>3</sup> that affected the overall responsiveness of DOD's urgent needs processes and then highlight the key findings and recommendations of today's report. Today's report contributed to our findings in another report being released today that addresses opportunities to reduce potential duplication in government programs.<sup>4</sup> In conducting our work, we analyzed DOD policies, guidance, studies, and other documents, interviewed DOD and military service officials, and executed a 46-question data-collection instrument to collect information from numerous DOD and military service entities having a role in the fulfillment of urgent needs. We conducted our work for the related report from February 2010 to March 2011 in accordance with generally accepted government auditing standards. Those standards require that we plan and perform the audit to obtain sufficient, appropriate evidence to provide a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives. We believe that the evidence obtained provides a reasonable basis for our findings and conclusions based on our audit objectives.

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## Background

As DOD's urgent needs processes have evolved, there have been several reviews of DOD's abilities to rapidly respond to and field needed capabilities. For example, according to senior DOD officials, the department has conducted a study to determine lessons learned from several independent urgent needs processes that might be integrated into the department's main acquisition process. However, two studies by the Defense Science Board in 2009 found that DOD had done little to adopt urgent needs as a critical, ongoing DOD institutional capability essential to addressing future threats.<sup>5</sup> Most recently, the Ike Skelton National Defense

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<sup>2</sup>GAO, *Warfighter Support: DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Need a More Comprehensive Approach and Evaluation for Potential Consolidation*, GAO-11-273 (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2011).

<sup>3</sup>GAO, *Warfighter Support: Improvements to DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Would Enhance Oversight and Expedite Efforts to Meet Critical Warfighter Needs*, GAO-10-460 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 2010).

<sup>4</sup>GAO, *Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue*, GAO-11-318SP (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 1, 2011).

<sup>5</sup>*Report of the Defense Science Board Task Force on the Fulfillment of Urgent Operational Needs* (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, July 2009); *Report of the Defense Science Board 2008 Summer Study on Capability Surprise*, vol. I: Main Report (Washington, D.C.: Office of the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics, September 2009).

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Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 requires DOD to review its processes for the fielding capabilities in response to urgent operational needs and consider such improvements as providing a streamlined and expedited approach, clearly defining the roles and responsibilities for carrying out all phases of the process, and establishing a formal feedback mechanism.<sup>6</sup>

We reported in April 2010 on several challenges that affected DOD's responsiveness to urgent needs.<sup>7</sup> Through our field work in Iraq and analysis of 23 case studies, we found that with the exception of one system all the solutions to our case studies were fielded within 2 years of being endorsed by a theater command—which was within DOD's informally established timeline for satisfying joint urgent operational needs. However, we found that challenges with training, funding, and technical maturity and complexity hindered DOD's ability to rapidly respond to urgent warfighter needs. The following summarizes these key findings and our recommendations. Additional information is provided in our April 2010 report.<sup>8</sup>

- **Training**—We found challenges in training personnel that process urgent needs requests. For example, we found that while the Army required selected officers to attend training on how to address requirements and identify resources for Army forces, officers at the brigade level responsible for drafting and submitting Army and joint urgent needs requests—and those at the division level responsible for reviewing the requests prior to submission for headquarters approval—were not likely to receive such training. As a result, once in theater, Army officers often faced difficulties drafting, submitting, and reviewing the volume of urgent needs requests, which, according to Army officials, could be over 200 per month. To address this challenge, we recommended that the Army update its training regimen for officers who initiate and review urgent needs requests. DOD partially concurred, stating that these training issues are applicable across the department and that it would develop additional policy.
- **Funding**—We found that funding was not always available when needed to acquire and field solutions to joint urgent needs. This result occurred in part because the Office of the Secretary of Defense had not given any one

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<sup>6</sup>Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 804 (2011).

<sup>7</sup>GAO-10-460.

<sup>8</sup>GAO-10-460

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organization primary responsibility for determining when to implement the department's statutory rapid acquisition authority or to execute timely funding decisions. We recommended that the Secretary of Defense designate an entity with primary responsibility for recommending use of rapid acquisition authority. The department partially concurred, and stated it would develop additional DOD policy for using rapid acquisition authority. In addition, we found that the Office of the Secretary of Defense had the authority, within certain dollar thresholds, to reprogram funds for purposes other than those specified by Congress at the time of the appropriation. However, in the absence of a high-level authority with primary responsibility for executing such reprogramming or transfer decisions, DOD faced challenges in consistently securing timely cooperation from the services or other components. We recommended DOD establish an executive council to make timely funding decisions on urgent need requests. DOD partially concurred, stating it would develop additional DOD policy and rely on existing councils to address our recommendation.

- **Technical maturity and complexity**—We found that attempts to meet urgent needs with immature technologies or with solutions that are technologically complex could lead to longer time frames for fielding solutions to urgent needs. Also, we found that DOD guidance was unclear about who is responsible for determining whether technologically complex solutions fall within the scope of DOD's urgent needs processes. We recommended that DOD issue guidance to clearly define roles and responsibilities for implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of all phases of the urgent needs process—including applying technological-maturity criteria. DOD concurred, stating that it would develop new policy and update existing policy.

We also reported in April 2010 that DOD had not established an effective management framework for its urgent needs processes.<sup>9</sup> Specifically, we reported that DOD's guidance for its urgent needs processes (1) was dispersed and outdated; (2) did not clearly define roles and responsibilities for implementing, monitoring, and evaluating all phases of those processes; and (3) did not incorporate all of the expedited acquisition authorities available to acquire joint urgent needs solutions. Further, we found that data systems for the urgent needs processes did not have comprehensive, reliable data for tracking overall results and did not have standards for collecting and managing data. In addition, we reported that the joint process did not include a formal method for feedback to inform

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<sup>9</sup>GAO-10-490

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joint leadership on the performance of solutions. Finally, we noted that in the absence of a management framework for its urgent needs processes, DOD did not have tools to fully assess how well its processes work, manage their performance, ensure efficient use of resources, and make decisions regarding the long-term sustainment of fielded capabilities. We made several recommendations to DOD to address these findings and DOD generally concurred with our recommendations. In June 2010, the Senate Armed Services Committee urged DOD to address these shortcomings that we identified “as quickly as possible.”<sup>10</sup>

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**DOD’s Urgent Needs Processes Need a More Comprehensive Approach and Evaluation for Potential Consolidation**

In our report being released today, we identified cases of fragmentation, overlap, and potential duplication of efforts of DOD’s urgent needs processes and entities. However, the department is hindered in its ability to identify key improvements to its urgent needs processes because it does not have a comprehensive approach to manage and oversee the breadth of its efforts. Further, DOD has not comprehensively evaluated opportunities for consolidation of urgent needs entities and processes across the department. In this new report, we made several recommendations to DOD for improving its management and oversight of urgent needs, and DOD fully concurred with those recommendations. The following summarizes our key findings and recommendations, which are provided in more detail in the report we publicly release today.<sup>11</sup>

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**Fulfillment of Urgent Needs Involves a Number of Entities and Processes, Resulting in Fragmentation, Overlap, and Potential Duplication of Efforts**

Over the past two decades, the department has established many entities that develop, equip, and field solutions and critical capabilities in response to the large number of urgent needs requests submitted by the combatant commands and military services. Many of these entities were created, in part, because the department had not anticipated the accelerated pace of change in enemy tactics and techniques that ultimately heightened the need for a rapid response to the large number of urgent needs requests submitted by the combatant commands and military services. While many entities started as ad hoc organizations, several have been permanently established. On the basis of DOD’s and our analysis, we identified at least 31 entities that play a significant role in the various urgent needs processes. Table 1 below shows the 31 entities we identified.

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<sup>10</sup>S. Rep. No. 111-201, at 160 (2010).

<sup>11</sup>GAO-11-273.



Table 1: DOD Entities Involved in the Fulfillment of Urgent Needs

| Office of the Secretary of Defense or Joint Staff     | Army                                                                                 | Navy                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                          | Marine Corps                                                             | Air Force                                                                                  | Special Operations Command                                       |
|-------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|-------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------|--------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------|------------------------------------------------------------------|
| Joint Staff, J8                                       | Deputy Chief of Staff, G-3/5/7, Current and Future Warfighting Capabilities Division | Chief of Naval Operations N81D                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                | Deputy Commandant for Combat                                             | Air Force Air Combat Command A8XM                                                          | Special Operations Command J8                                    |
| Rapid Fielding Directorate                            | Blometrics Identity Management Agency                                                | U.S. Fleet Forces Command                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                     | Combat Development and Integration, Capabilities Development Directorate | Air Force Air Mobility Command A5QX                                                        | Special Operations Research, Development, and Acquisition Center |
| Intelligence, Surveillance, Reconnaissance Task Force | Asymmetric Warfare Group                                                             | U.S. Pacific Fleet                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                            | PM or PEO,* such as PM Light Armored Vehicles                            | Requirements Policy & Process Division, Directorate of Operational Capability Requirements |                                                                  |
| Mine Resistant Ambush Protected (vehicle) Task Force  | Rapid Fielding Initiative                                                            | Rapid Action Teams, led by a Chief of Naval Operations Sponsor                                                                                                                                                                                                                |                                                                          | Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Air Force for Acquisition                         |                                                                  |
| Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization | Rapid Equipping Force                                                                | Deputy Assistant Secretary of the Navy, Expeditionary Warfare                                                                                                                                                                                                                 |                                                                          | PM or PEO,* such as Aeronautical Systems Center                                            |                                                                  |
| Rapid Reaction Technology Office                      | Army Capabilities Integration Center, U.S. Army Training & Doctrine Command          | Project Manager (PM) or Program Executive Offices (PEO),* such as Night Vision / Reconnaissance, Surveillance, and Target Acquisition (including Base Expeditionary Targeting and Surveillance Sensors—Combined) or the Counter Rocket, Artillery, Mortar Program Directorate | Rapid Development and Deployment Office                                  |                                                                                            |                                                                  |
| Joint Capability Technology Demonstrations            |                                                                                      | PM or PEO,* such as PEO Littoral and Mine Warfare                                                                                                                                                                                                                             |                                                                          |                                                                                            |                                                                  |
| Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell                          |                                                                                      |                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                                               |                                                                          |                                                                                            |                                                                  |

Source: GAO analysis of DOD data.

\*Each military service has program offices responsible for specific programs or portfolios of similar programs that may include solutions to validated urgent need requirements. However, we have not identified the universe of PMs/PEOs that are or have been involved in the fulfillment of urgent needs.

We found that fragmentation and overlap exist among urgent needs entities and processes. For example, there are at least eight processes and related points of entry for the warfighter to submit a request for an urgently needed capability, including through the Joint Staff and each military service. Entities within these processes then validate the submitted urgent need request and thus allow it to proceed through their specific process. Moreover, our analysis showed that overlap exists among urgent needs entities in the roles they play as well as the capabilities for

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which they are responsible. For example, at the joint level we found six entities involved in facilitating urgent needs requests and five entities involved in providing sourcing support for urgent needs requests.<sup>12</sup> Additionally, several entities have focused on developing solutions for the same subject areas, such as counter-IED and ISR capabilities, potentially resulting in duplication of efforts. For example, both the Army and the Marine Corps had their own separate efforts to develop counter-IED mine rollers.

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**DOD Does Not Have Comprehensive Guidance and Full Visibility to Effectively Manage and Oversee Its Urgent Needs**

DOD has taken some steps to improve its fulfillment of urgent needs. These steps include developing policy to guide joint urgent need efforts, establishing a Rapid Fielding Directorate to rapidly transition innovative concepts into critical capabilities, and working to establish a senior oversight council to help synchronize DOD's efforts. Despite these actions, the department does not have a comprehensive approach to manage and oversee the breadth of its activities to address capability gaps identified by warfighters in-theater. Federal internal control standards require detailed policies, procedures, and practices to help program managers achieve desired results through effective stewardship of public resources.<sup>13</sup> However, DOD does not have a comprehensive, DOD-wide policy that establishes a baseline and provides a common approach for how all joint and military service urgent needs are to be addressed—including key activities of the process such as validation, execution, or tracking. Additionally, we found that DOD has a fragmented approach in managing all of its urgent needs submissions and validated requirements. For example, the Joint Staff, the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization (JIEDDO), the military services, and the Special Operations

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<sup>12</sup>Through our analysis, we identified several broad activities involved in the processing of urgent needs. Facilitation refers to the development and coordination of requirements, costs, potential solution, funding, and other factors related to the course of action to be taken for the fulfillment of an urgent need. Sourcing is the approval of the proposed course of action and assignment of a sponsor who will carry out that course of action.

<sup>13</sup> GAO, *Standards for Internal Control in the Federal Government*, GAO/AIMD-00-21.3.1 (Washington, DC: November 1999).

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Command have issued their own guidance, which varied, outlining activities involved in processing and meeting their specific urgent needs.<sup>14</sup>

DOD also lacks visibility over the full range of urgent needs efforts—from funding to measuring results. Specifically, we found that DOD does not have (1) visibility over the total costs of its urgent needs efforts, (2) a comprehensive tracking system, (3) a universal set of metrics, and (4) a senior-level focal point. The following summarizes these key findings.

- **DOD does not have visibility over total costs.** DOD cannot readily identify the cost of its departmentwide urgent needs efforts. Based on the information submitted to us in response to our data request, the total funding for the fulfillment of urgent needs is at least \$76.9 billion from fiscal year 2005 through fiscal year 2010.<sup>15</sup> Because DOD does not have visibility over all urgent needs efforts and costs, it is not fully able to identify the need for key process improvements and adjust program and budgetary priorities accordingly.
- **DOD does not have a comprehensive tracking system.** DOD cannot readily identify the totality of its urgent needs efforts as well as the cost of such efforts because it has limited visibility over all urgent needs submitted by warfighters—both from joint and service-specific sources. Specifically, DOD and the services have disparate ways of tracking urgent needs; some have formal databases to input information while others use more informal methods such as e-mailing to solicit feedback. For example, the Joint Chiefs of Staff and each of the military services utilize electronic databases to track capability solutions as they move through the urgent needs process. However, more than a third of the entities involved in the process did not collect or provide the necessary information for the joint or service-based systems to track those solutions. Moreover, there was

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<sup>14</sup>Joint Staff: Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction 3470.01 (July 15, 2005); Army: Army Regulation 71-9 (Dec. 28, 2009); Navy: Joint Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research Development and Acquisition) (July 19, 2007) and Secretary of the Navy Notice 5000 (Mar. 12, 2009); Marine Corps: Marine Corps Order 3900.17 (Oct. 17, 2008); Air Force: Air Force Instruction 63-114 (June 12, 2008); Air Force Instruction 10-601 (July 12, 2010); JIEDDO: Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization Instruction 5000.01 (Nov. 6, 2009); Special Operations Command: Special Operations Command Directive 71-4 (June 9, 2009) and Special Operations Command Directive 70-1 (Mar. 19, 2010).

<sup>15</sup>Our estimate includes funding for processing of urgent needs as well as development of solutions and some acquisition costs. As our data request was not exhaustive, the numbers reported are a lower bound to the total amount spent on urgent needs rather than an upper bound. Additionally, our funding data have been converted to base year 2010 dollars.

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confusion over whose role it was to collect and input data into these tracking systems.

- **DOD does not have a universal set of metrics.** Our analysis found that the feedback mechanisms across DOD, the Joint Staff, the military services, JIEDDO, and the Special Operations Command are varied and fragmented. In April 2010, we recommended that DOD develop an established, formal feedback mechanism or channel for the military services to provide feedback to the Joint Chiefs of Staff and Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell on how well fielded solutions met urgent needs. The department concurred with the recommendation and stated that it would develop new DOD policy and that the Joint Chiefs of Staff would update the Chairman's instruction to establish requirements for oversight and management of the fulfillment of urgent needs. However, the majority of DOD urgent needs entities we surveyed for our March 2011 report said that they do not collect all the data needed to determine how well these solutions are performing. Additionally, in April 2010, we also recommended that DOD develop and implement standards for accurately tracking and documenting key process milestones such as funding, acquisition, fielding, and assessment, and for updating data-management systems to create activity reports to facilitate management review and external oversight of the process. DOD agreed with these recommendations and noted actions it planned to take to address them. However, our current analysis found that the department lacked a method or metric to track the status of a validated urgent requirement across the services and DOD components, such as whether a requirement currently in development could be applicable to another service.
- **DOD does not have a senior-level focal point.** DOD's lack of visibility over all urgent needs requests is due in part to the lack of a senior-level focal point (i.e., gatekeeper) that has the responsibility to manage, oversee, and have full visibility to track and monitor all emerging capability gaps being identified by warfighters in-theater. At present, the department has not established a senior-level focal point to (1) lead the department's efforts to fulfill validated urgent needs requirements, (2) develop and implement DOD-wide policy on the processing of urgent needs or rapid acquisition, or (3) maintain full visibility over its urgent needs efforts and the costs of those efforts. We have previously testified and reported on the benefits of establishing a single point of focus at a sufficiently senior level to coordinate and integrate various DOD efforts to

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address concerns, such as with counterterrorism and the transformation of military capabilities.<sup>16</sup>

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**Opportunities Exist for Consolidating Urgent Needs Processes and Entities**

In addition to not having a comprehensive approach for managing and overseeing its urgent needs efforts, DOD has not conducted a comprehensive evaluation of its urgent needs processes and entities to identify opportunities for consolidation. Given the overlap and potential for duplication we identified, coupled with similar concerns raised by other studies, there may be opportunities for DOD to further improve its urgent needs processes through consolidation. GAO's Business Process Reengineering Assessment Guide establishes that such a comprehensive analysis of alternative processes should be performed to include a performance-based, risk-adjusted analysis of benefits and costs for each alternative.<sup>17</sup> In our current report, we identified and analyzed several options, aimed at potential consolidations and increased efficiencies, in an effort to provide ideas for the department to consider in streamlining its urgent needs entities and processes. These options include the following:

- Consolidate into one Office of the Secretary of Defense-level entity all the urgent needs processes of the services and DOD, while allowing the services' program offices to maintain responsibility for developing solutions.
- Consolidate entities that have overlapping mission or capability portfolios related to urgent needs, such as entities involved in the development of solutions for biometrics.
- Establish a gatekeeper within each service to oversee all key activities to fulfill a validated urgent need requirement.
- Consolidate within each service any overlapping activities in the urgent needs process, such as the multiple entry and validation points that exist in the Army.

The options we identified were not meant to be exhaustive or mutually exclusive. DOD would need to perform its own analysis, carefully weighing the advantages and disadvantages of options it identifies to determine the optimal course of action. Additionally, it must be recognized

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<sup>16</sup>GAO, *Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and National Strategy*, GAO-01-556T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 27, 2001) and *Military Transformation: Clear Leadership, Accountability, and Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD's Efforts to Transform Military Capabilities*, GAO-05-70 (Washington, D.C.: Dec. 17, 2004).

<sup>17</sup>GAO, *Business Process Reengineering Assessment Guide*, ver. 3, GAO/AIMD-10.1.15 (Washington, D.C.: May 1997).

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that many entities involved in the fulfillment of urgent needs have other roles as well. However, until DOD performs such an evaluation, it will remain unaware of opportunities for consolidation and increased efficiencies in the fulfillment of urgent needs.

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**GAO Recommends That  
DOD Establish  
Comprehensive Guidance  
and Evaluate Potential  
Options for Consolidation**

In the report we publicly release today, we make several recommendations to promote a more comprehensive approach to planning, management, and oversight of DOD's fulfillment of urgent needs. In summary, we are recommending that:

- DOD develop and promulgate DOD-wide guidance across all urgent needs processes that establishes baseline policy for the fulfillment of urgent needs, clearly defines common terms, roles, responsibilities, and authorities, designates a focal point to lead DOD's urgent needs efforts, and directs the DOD components to establish minimum urgent needs processes and requirements; and
- DOD's Chief Management Officer evaluate potential options for consolidation to reduce overlap, duplication, and fragmentation, and take appropriate action.

DOD concurred with all of our recommendations and stated that specific actions it will take to address these recommendations will be identified in a report on its urgent needs processes that is required by the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 and due to Congress in January 2012.<sup>15</sup> DOD also stated that the Deputy Chief Management Officer, supported by the military services' Chief Management Officers, will participate in this end-to-end review and provide oversight and assistance in utilizing process improvement techniques and tools.

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**Concluding Remarks**

Over the past several years we have identified significant challenges affecting DOD's ability to rapidly respond to urgent needs of the warfighter and effectively manage and oversee the breadth of its urgent needs processes. It is noteworthy that DOD has recognized these challenges and continues to take steps towards improving its programs. However, until the department holistically examines the entirety of its various urgent needs processes and entities, including evaluating the need for consolidation, and establishes clear and comprehensive policy, it will

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<sup>15</sup>Pub. L. No. 111-383, § 804 (2011).

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not be in a position to ensure the warfighter, Congress, or the public that its processes are addressing the critical needs of U.S. forces in the most timely, efficient, and effective manner. Given the magnitude of the financial resources at stake, coupled with the need to field urgent need solutions as rapidly as possible to prevent loss of life or mission failure, it is imperative that DOD's senior leadership make it a top priority to reform its urgent needs process.

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Mr. Chairman, this concludes my statement. I would be happy to answer any questions you or other members of the subcommittee may have at this time.

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## Contacts and Acknowledgments


For further information regarding this testimony, please contact William Solis at (202) 512-8365 or [solisw@gao.gov](mailto:solisw@gao.gov). In addition, contact points for our Offices of Congressional Relations and Public Affairs may be found on the last page of this statement. Individuals who made key contributions to this testimony are Cary Russell, Assistant Director; Usman Ahmad, Laura Czohara, Lonnie McAllister, John Ortiz, Richard Powelson, Steve Pruitt, Ryan Stott, Elizabeth Wood, Delia Zee, and Karen Zuckerstein.





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**William M. Solis**

Director

Director, Defense Capabilities and Management Team

U.S. Government Accountability Office

Mr. Solis is a Director in the Defense Capabilities and Management team in the U.S. Government Accountability Office. The Comptroller General of the United States appointed him to this position in July 2002.

As a Director he is responsible for a wide range of program audits and evaluations that GAO undertakes in the area of warfighter support and defense logistics focusing on programs of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, Defense Logistics Agency as well as joint and OSD programs. More specifically his portfolio of work covers issues such as operational contract support, operational energy, urgent needs, force protection for ground forces, in-theater supply chain management, maintenance, transportation, sustainment, and equipment reset. More recently the focus of his work has been on issues related to OEF and OIF.

In discharging his responsibilities, Mr. Solis works with congressional authorization, appropriation, and oversight committees. He interacts with Members of Congress and their principal staffs and with key officials in the national security community within the executive branch.

Mr. Solis has served in a wide variety of GAO line and staff assignments and has been the recipient of numerous GAO awards. In 2008, he was the recipient of the GAO Distinguished Service award. Prior to his appointment as a Director his audit engagements included work on military readiness and training, weapon system effectiveness, housing and military doctrine.

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**QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MEMBERS POST HEARING**

MARCH 1, 2011

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. BARTLETT

Mr. BARTLETT. Mr. Dee, we understand from GAO's report and testimony today that DOD does not have in place a comprehensive approach for managing all of its various urgent needs processes. More specifically, GAO said DOD needs to develop DOD-wide guidance that, among other things, defines roles, responsibilities and authorities, and designates a senior-level focal point for urgent needs. GAO also recommended that DOD evaluate potential options for consolidation. We understand DOD concurred with all of GAO's recommendations. Can you tell us what specific actions DOD plans to take to address them? Given that DOD concurred with GAO's recommendation to evaluate potential options for consolidation, can you give us examples of where you might consolidate urgent needs entities and/or processes, and any cost savings you may achieve through such consolidation? We understand that DOD is developing new guidance for its urgent needs processes, to be issued as a directive type memorandum. When do you expect this new guidance to be issued?

Mr. DEE. As part of the review directed by Section 804 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111-383), we will consider the various improvements to the acquisition process for rapid fielding of capabilities in response to urgent operational needs. The assessment will address the specific items required by Section 804 as well as those that have been recommended by the GAO, the FY09 Defense Science Board Report and others. Specifically we intend to develop DOD-wide guidance and evaluate potential options for consolidation. This review and report to Congress will be completed by January 7, 2012.

As stated in our response to GAO report 11-273, published March 1, 2011, we will assess options for consolidation as part of the Section 804 study.

We are currently coordinating a draft DOD policy memorandum to establish a "Senior Integration Group for the Resolution of Joint Urgent Operational Needs." Completion is contingent on the successful resolution of any critical comments we receive but we anticipate finalizing the memorandum in April 2011.

Mr. BARTLETT. Section 804 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 calls for the Department to conduct a broad review of its urgent needs processes and report back to the Congress in January 2012. Who in the Department will be responsible for conducting this study? Based on the results of that study will an implementation plan be developed for any actions to be taken, to include milestones and metric to measure progress? Who would be responsible for developing and implementing such a plan? Do you anticipate the Department will take any actions prior to reporting back to Congress in January 2012?

Mr. DEE. The Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics will have overall responsibility for conducting the review in coordination with other components of the Office of the Secretary of Defense, The Joint Staff and the Services. We are unable to appropriately respond to your other questions until completion of the review.

Mr. BARTLETT. Numerous solutions have been developed and fielded in response to urgent needs over the past several years. These include large equipment items such as MRAPs, sophisticated counter-IED technologies and teams of experts to provide support with law enforcement and cultural awareness issues. Does your office track the amount of equipment and other solutions that have been fielded, and if so how much has been fielded in terms of costs? If you do not track these solutions, who does? Does DOD have visibility over how well urgent needs solutions are performing? If so, has the Department performed analyses of this data and what are the results of any such analyses?

Mr. DEE. Urgent needs are primarily satisfied through Service acquisition processes and deployed in support of U.S. Forces who maintain accountability for the equipment and other urgent needs solutions. We do not have nor can we readily obtain a cost for the amount of equipment and other solutions that have been fielded. The Defense Science Board estimated, in September 2009, that \$50B was spent by DOD for urgent warfighter needs from 2005 to 2009. Subsequently, the GAO estimated that department-wide urgent needs efforts cost at least \$76.9B from Fiscal Year 2005-2010.

The various DOD Components fulfilling urgent needs track equipment and costs in accordance with Component and Department policy. Joint IED Defeat Organization, the Army's Rapid Equipping Force, Army Test and Evaluation Command, the Marine Corps Systems Command and many other Departmental organizations provide a robust presence in theater to evaluate the performance of their equipment and report on their capabilities and limitations.

The Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell hosts a monthly Central Command Joint Urgent Operational Needs (JUONs) Review to monitor progress in the fulfillment of JUONs and to provide CENTCOM with a venue to discuss any problems identified in their deployment or effectiveness of JUON solutions. Services maintain oversight of their responses to Component specific urgent needs.

There have been no Department level analyses on the performance of urgent needs solutions. Service testing organizations often review the performance of individual initiatives to assess their capabilities and limitations and report these results to the Services.

Mr. BARTLETT. In November of 2009, the Secretary of Defense established the Counter-IED Senior Integration Group (or CSIG) to integrate, prioritize and accelerate activities across the Department of Defense to counter the IED threat in Afghanistan. We understand that this group was initially planned to be temporary and to be discontinued in June 2010. What role has JRAC had with respect to the CSIG? How have the roles of this group fit into the urgent needs processes? Can you tell us what the status is of this group and is the department considering similar senior-level involvement for other urgent needs areas beyond counter-IED? Was the CSIG created to overcome any authority issues with regard to JRAC or the Joint IED Defeat Organization? If so, what were these limitations and how has CSIG been able to overcome them?

Mr. DEE. The Director, Joint Rapid Acquisition Cell (JRAC), participates as a member of the C-SIG. The C-SIG's role has evolved to become the Department's senior level governance council with oversight of many of the most critical urgent needs of our operational Commanders, not just Counter IED requirements. The C-SIG is expected to be re-chartered as the Senior Integration Group, in the near future, to reflect its broader role as the senior level governance council for the Department's urgent operational needs.

No, the C-SIG was not created to overcome any authority issues with regard to JRAC or the Joint IED Defeat Organization.

Mr. BARTLETT. JRAC has moved organizationally a couple of times in the past few years, with the latest move elevating it to directly report to the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. Why was this latest change made? Did JRAC previously experience any issues with having the necessary authority to do its mission? Do you believe this latest move places JRAC in the most appropriate position, and does JRAC have the authority it needs to effectively carry out its roles and responsibilities?

Mr. DEE. This organizational change was made to streamline the decision process for those urgent needs submitted by the operational Commanders and validated by the Joint Staff.

The JRAC did not previously experience any issues with having the necessary authority to do its mission.

Yes, the personal involvement of senior leadership in the resolution of Joint Urgent Operational needs ensures that the JRAC is well positioned for success and provided ample authority to carry out its roles and responsibilities.

Mr. BARTLETT. As Mr. Solis from GAO stated in his testimony, in April 2010, GAO cited challenges in obtaining funding as a major factor that increased the time needed to field urgent needs solutions to the warfighter. Accordingly, to improve the availability of funding, GAO recommended that DOD (1) designate an entity to recommend the use of rapid acquisition authority to the Secretary of Defense where appropriate for urgent needs and (2) create an executive council to make timely funding decisions as urgent needs are validated. What action has DOD taken with regard to GAO's recommendations? What other actions, if any, have DOD taken to improve the timely availability of funding for urgent needs? Does DOD have a means to continually evaluate the timeliness of its urgent needs funding processes and, if so, what does this evaluation show?

Mr. DEE. The JRAC currently serves as the entity recommending use of rapid acquisition authority to the Secretary of Defense. The Counter Improvised Explosive Device Senior Integration Group (C-SIG), soon to be the Senior Integration Group (SIG), is a senior governance council co-chaired by the USD(AT&L) and The Joint Staff J-3 that provides oversight of the funding, contracting and fulfillment of critical urgent needs.

The Department uses Overseas Contingency Operation (OCO) funding, below-threshold reprogramming, above threshold reprogramming, and rapid acquisition authority to provide funding for urgent needs during the year of execution.

To mitigate the inherent delays in the reprogramming process, the Department has requested funds for urgent operational needs. The Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 budget submission included a \$300M OCO request which has not been appropriated and was not supported by the Defense committees. The FY12 President's Budget Request includes \$100M in the base budget and an additional \$100M in the OCO request to provide an immediate source of funding for urgent needs.

The JRAC monitors funding of Joint Urgent Operational Needs and the Military Departments provide oversight of their respective requirements. The JRAC has supported the C-SIG, in its evolving role, in monitoring the funding status of urgent operational needs under the oversight of the C-SIG. These evaluations have again demonstrated, as the GAO and others have found, that there are improvements that can be made to the funding processes. The results of the evaluations will be folded into the process improvements considered as part of the assessment and process improvements required by section 804 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for FY11 (Public Law 111-383). Funding process improvements will be addressed in the report to Congress required by section 804.

Mr. BARTLETT. How do you see the future integration of DOD's urgent needs processes with its traditional acquisition system? Will these two processes remain separate or will there eventually be one integrated approach?

Mr. DEE. The urgent needs processes are currently under review in response to section 804 of the Ike Skelton National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2011 (Public Law 111-383). The relationship of urgent needs processes and the "traditional acquisition system" will be assessed as a part of this review.

Mr. BARTLETT. In your testimony, you said that GAO identified at least 31 entities that have a role in managing urgent needs, and that overlap and potential duplication exists among these entities. Can you give us an example of where such overlap and potential duplication may exist?

Mr. SOLIS. As cited in our most recent reports<sup>1</sup> and testimony<sup>2</sup>, we found that overlap exists among urgent needs entities in the roles they play as well as the capabilities for which they are responsible. For example:

- There are numerous places for the warfighter to submit a request for an urgently needed capability. Warfighters may submit urgent needs, depending on their military service and the type of need, to one of the following different entities: Joint Staff J/8, Army Deputy Chief of Staff G/3/5/7, Army Rapid Equipping Force, Navy Fleet Forces Command or Commander Pacific Fleet, Marine Corps Deputy Commandant for Combat Development and Integration, Air Force Major Commands, Special Operations Requirements and Resources, or the Joint Improvised Explosive Device Defeat Organization. These entities then validate the submitted urgent need request and thus allow it to proceed through their specific process.
- Multiple entities reported a role in responding to similar types of urgently needed capabilities. GAO identified eight entities focused on responding to intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) capabilities, five entities focused on responding to counter-improvised explosive device (IED) capabilities, and six entities focused on responding to communications, command and control, and computer technology.

Additionally, we found potential duplication of efforts as several entities have focused on developing solutions for the same subject areas, such as counter-IED and ISR capabilities. For example, both the Army and the Marine Corps had their own separate efforts to develop counter-IED mine rollers.

Mr. BARTLETT. In your testimony you say that GAO identified "at least" 31 entities and that you identified funding for urgent needs to be "at least" \$76.9 billion. Why can't you be more specific as to the total number of urgent needs entities and costs?

Mr. SOLIS. As cited in our recent work<sup>3</sup>, DOD cannot readily identify the totality of its urgent needs efforts, including the cost of such efforts, because it has limited

<sup>1</sup>GAO, *Warfighter Support: DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Need a More Comprehensive Approach and Evaluation for Potential Consolidation*, GAO-11-273 (Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2011) and GAO, *Opportunities to Reduce Potential Duplication in Government Programs, Save Tax Dollars, and Enhance Revenue*, GAO-11-318SP (Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2011).

<sup>2</sup>GAO, *Warfighter Support: DOD Should Have a More Comprehensive Approach for Addressing Urgent Warfighter Needs*, GAO-11-417T (Washington, D.C.: March 1, 2011).

<sup>3</sup>GAO-11-273 and GAO-11-417T.

visibility over all urgent needs submitted by warfighters—both from joint and service-specific sources. DOD and service officials cited two impediments to full visibility: the lack of a comprehensive tracking system to manage and oversee all urgent needs identified by the warfighter and a lack of clearly defined roles. Thus, we describe our estimate to be “at least” because the amounts we reported may underestimate the actual total amounts expended on urgent needs from fiscal years 2005 through 2010 because the list of entities is not exhaustive. In conducting our work, we cast a wide net in an attempt to capture the universe of urgent needs entities and costs.

Mr. BARTLETT. You said that in addition to lacking comprehensive guidance, DOD does not have a senior-level focal point for urgent needs. Why is it so important that DOD have such a focal point?

Mr. SOLIS. As cited in our recent work<sup>4</sup>, it is important that DOD have a senior-level focal point to manage, oversee, and have full visibility to track and monitor all emerging capability gaps being identified by warfighters in-theater. Specifically, a focal point is necessary to 1) lead the department’s efforts to fulfill validated urgent needs requirements; (2) act as an advocate within the department for issues related to DOD’s ability to rapidly respond to urgent needs; (3) develop and implement DOD-wide policy on the processing of urgent needs or rapid acquisition, or (4) maintain full visibility over its urgent needs efforts and the costs of those efforts. Moreover, without establishment of a senior-level focal point, DOD officials may be unable to identify areas for improvement, including consolidation, to prioritize validated but unfunded requirements, to identify funding challenges and a means to address such challenges, or ensure collaboration to modify capabilities in development to meet several similar urgent needs requirements—and may be unable to reduce any overlap or duplication that may exist as solutions are developed or modified. We have previously testified<sup>5</sup> and reported<sup>6</sup> on the benefits of establishing a single point of focus at a sufficiently senior level to coordinate and integrate various DOD efforts to address concerns, such as with counterterrorism and the transformation of military capabilities.

Mr. BARTLETT. You point out that DOD does not have a universal set of metrics for its urgent needs processes. Are you saying that DOD cannot determine whether its processes are working or not?

Mr. SOLIS. As cited in our recent work<sup>7</sup>, we found that disparate tracking systems limit DOD’s visibility over its urgent needs process and can hamper improvement efforts. Although the Joint Staff and the military services maintain databases to track urgent needs solutions as they move through their processes, more than a third of the entities we reviewed did not collect or provide the necessary information to those systems to track the solutions. Having disparate systems and a lack of adequate data makes it very difficult for DOD to comprehensively evaluate the progress of urgent needs solutions, perform analyses to determine effectiveness of the overall processes, and identify needed improvements.

Further, our work found that DOD has not established a universal set of metrics for evaluating the effectiveness and tracking the status of solutions provided to the warfighter. The majority of DOD urgent needs entities we surveyed reported that they do not collect all the data needed to determine how well these solutions are performing. Thus, DOD and military service officials have limited awareness of all urgent needs—including how well those needs are being met—which can hamper their ability to effectively manage and identify areas where overlap and duplication exist. Without the establishment of a metric or mechanism to track the status of a validated requirement, including its transition, and full visibility, the department may not be able to identify key improvements. Moreover, without a formal feedback mechanism or channel for the military services to provide feedback, the department is likely to be unaware of how well fielded solutions are performing.

Mr. BARTLETT. In your report, you recommend that DOD’s Chief Management Officer should evaluate potential options for consolidation and you provide several examples of such consolidations. Are you saying DOD should pick one of these, or is your recommendation much broader?

Mr. SOLIS. We did not intend that the department be limited to those ideas we presented. We analyzed several operations aimed at potential consolidations and in-

<sup>4</sup>GAO–11–273 and GAO–11–417T.

<sup>5</sup>GAO, *Combating Terrorism: Comments on Counterterrorism Leadership and National Strategy*, GAO–01–556T (Washington, D.C.: Mar. 27, 2001).

<sup>6</sup>GAO, *Military Transformation: Clear Leadership Accountability, and Management Tools Are Needed to Enhance DOD’s Efforts to Transform Military Capabilities*, GAO–05–70 (Washington, DC.: Dec. 17, 2004).

<sup>7</sup>GAO–11–273 and GAO–11–417T.



creased efficiencies in an effort to provide ideas for the department to consider in streamlining its urgent needs entities and processes. The options GAO identified are not meant to be exhaustive or mutually exclusive. The examples we provided may not be the only possible ways to consolidate urgent needs entities or processes. We recognize there are benefits and trade-offs for each potential option and that DOD would need to perform its own analysis, carefully weighing the advantages and disadvantages of options it identifies to determine the optimal course of action. Given the increasing number of urgent needs and the escalating fiscal challenges, it is critical for DOD to reevaluate the current status of how it fulfills its urgent needs and whether there is potential to reduce duplication, fragmentation, and overlap to achieve increased efficiencies or cost savings, or both.

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#### QUESTIONS SUBMITTED BY MR. TURNER

Mr. TURNER. Current conversation on the Budget has shifted focus from the warfighter. In his State of the Union address President Obama devoted only six sentences to the war in Afghanistan. The 25-second standing ovation that followed lasted almost as long as the President's war remarks. I am concerned that our government's diverted attention from the war in Afghanistan will result in an underfunding of important programs that will cost the lives of the men and women in uniform fighting on the front lines.

Will the Secretary of Defense's efficiency plan and defense cuts in any way prevent our men and women in uniform from receiving the modern equipment and support that they need?

Mr. DEE. The Department continues to fund the urgent operational needs of the warfighter and uses Overseas Contingency Operations (OCO) funding, below-threshold reprogramming, above-threshold reprogramming, and rapid acquisition authority to provide funding for urgent needs during the year of execution.

The President has supported and continues to support funding requests to fulfill urgent operational needs. The President's Fiscal Year (FY) 2011 budget submission included a \$300M OCO request to be used to fund urgent operational needs. This has not been appropriated and was not supported by the Defense Committees. This has required the Department to fund such urgent needs using other authorities that, in some instances, added delay in providing capability to the warfighter.

The FY12 President's Budget Request includes \$100M in the base budget and an additional \$100M in the OCO request to provide an immediate source of funding for urgent needs. While this money would not fully fund all of the Department's urgent needs, it would allow sufficient funds to initiate actions immediately while additional funds are requested through Congress.

Mr. TURNER. Much has been said about the effects of the continuing resolution on military operations.

- a. To date, how has the continuing resolution impacted the warfighter?
- b. Explain how the continuing resolution could continue to endanger our troops?
- c. What would be the impact of a yearlong continuing resolution on equipping the warfighter?

Mr. DEE. Secretary Gates has stated that a yearlong continuing resolution or significant funding cut for Fiscal Year 2011 will cause a crisis for the Department of Defense. This includes significant impacts on the Department's responsiveness to urgent needs. It affects anticipated urgent needs because we can't access budgeted funding and must reprogram funds to cover these requirements. It also adversely impacts operations and maintenance (O&M) requirements because we are unable to reprogram any funding into the O&M account.

Mr. TURNER. Current conversation on the Budget has shifted focus from the warfighter. In his State of the Union address President Obama devoted only six sentences to the war in Afghanistan. The 25-second standing ovation that followed lasted almost as long as the President's war remarks. I am concerned that our government's diverted attention from the war in Afghanistan will result in an underfunding of important programs that will cost the lives of the men and women in uniform fighting on the front lines.

Will the Secretary of Defense's efficiency plan and defense cuts in any way prevent our men and women in uniform from receiving the modern equipment and support that they need?

Mr. SOLIS. Our work has not evaluated the impact of the Secretary of Defense's efficiency plan or defense cuts on meeting urgent needs identified by the warfighter. However, we have examined funding issues related to urgent needs in the past. For

example, in April 2010<sup>8</sup>, we reported that the amount of time needed to field urgent needs solutions has been increased by the challenge of obtaining funding, in one case adding as much as 293 days to the time needed to field a solution to the warfighter. We found that funding challenges exist in part because the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) has not given any one organization primary responsibility for determining when to implement the department's statutory rapid acquisition authority or to execute timely funding decisions. In addition, we reported that DOD can reprogram funds appropriated for other purposes to meet urgent needs requests, but authority for determining when and how to reprogram funds has been delegated to the services and combatant commands. However, we found that the services are reluctant to reprogram funds from their respective budgets to fund solutions to joint urgent needs and that DOD faced challenges in consistently securing timely cooperation from them. Our prior work<sup>9</sup> has demonstrated that strong leadership from OSD over resource control is critical to overcoming the deeply entrenched nature of the department's financial management challenges. Accordingly, we recommended in April 2010 that the Secretary of Defense designate an entity with primary responsibility for recommending use of rapid acquisition authority and that DOD establish an executive council to make timely funding decisions on urgent need requests. The department partially concurred with these recommendations and identified actions it planned to take to address them.

Mr. TURNER. Much has been said about the effects of the continuing resolution on military operations.

- a. To date, how has the continuing resolution impacted the warfighter?
- b. Explain how the continuing resolution could continue to endanger our troops?
- c. What would be the impact of a yearlong continuing resolution on equipping the warfighter?

Mr. SOLIS. The continuing resolution was not within the scope of our work. Thus, we did not evaluate the impact of continuing resolutions on equipping the warfighter. However, as stated previously, we have identified cases in prior work where funding challenges have lengthened the time needed to field urgent needs solutions to the warfighter. In these cases, the funding issues we identified occurred in part because DOD may not have been effectively managing the resources it had. For example, as noted above, in April 2010, we reported that funding has not always been provided in a timely manner for joint urgent needs in part because OSD has played a reactive rather than proactive role in making decisions about when to invoke the department's rapid acquisition authority. In addition, we reported that DOD delegated the authority for determining when and how to reprogram funds for addressing urgent needs to the services and combatant commands, but faced challenges in consistently securing timely cooperation from them.



<sup>8</sup>GAO, *Warfighter Support: Improvements to DOD's Urgent Needs Processes Would Enhance Oversight and Expedite Efforts to Meet Critical Warfighter Needs*, GAO-10-460 (Washington, D.C.: Apr. 30, 2010).

<sup>9</sup>GAO, *Defense Infrastructure: High-Level Leadership Needed to Help Communities Address Challenges Caused by DOD-Related Growth*, GAO-08-665 (Washington, D.C.: June 17, 2008).